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Abstract. 
This thesis will critically evaluate the nee-Marxist 
interpretations of New Zealand history propounded by David 
Bedggood, Rob Steven and Warwick Armstrong. This critique-
finds that the theoretical models adopted by these neo-
Marxists have gaps and contradictions and do not conform to 
the historical record. 
1 
We will find that these interpretations misconstrue the 
nature and causes of certain aspects of New Zealand history. 
Firstly, .the annexation of New Zealand in 1840 was not 
explicable in terms of Britain's need to provide itself with 
an outlet for surplus population. Secondly, New Zealand's 
affluence was not the result of its ability to exploit its 
trading partners via a global system of unequal exchange. 
Thirdly, New Zealand's dependence on a narrow range of 
export staples was not the result of a domestic ruling class 
perusing policies which were specifically designed to 
satisfy the productive and consumptive needs of British 
capitalism. 
Overall, the development of New Zealand provides the 
neo.-Marxist theory of "world-systems analysis" with one of 
its most crucial objections. 
2 
Introduction. 
The global expansion of the capitalist system has 
continued to gather momentum since it emerged in Britain and 
northwestern Europe. This expansion has had a profound 
impact on the development of those nations which have 
subsequently adopted the capitalist mode of production. In 
his analysis of the imperatives of this mode of production, 
Marx concluded that the global expansion of capitalism would 
eventually result in all nations developing in accordance 
with his universal laws of capital accumulation. Unless the 
socialist revolution came first, newly capitalist nations 
would attain levels of development already achieved by more 
advanced capitalist nations like Britain. That the 
development of all nations would replicate the process 
already underway in Britain formed the basis of the orthodox 
Marxist view that imperialism, the process which describes 
the global expansion of capitalism, was both progressive and 
desirable. 
In a revision of classical Marxist views of the 
operation of capitalism on a global scale, 11 neo-Marxists 11 
led by the Wallerstein school have concluded that the 
development which imperialism brings to much of the world is 
regressive and undesirable. According to this perspective, 
capitalism's penetration of the third world has brought 
about patterns of development which prevent it from ever 
replicating first world patterns of development. A 
confirmation of the retrograde impact of imperialism is 
often sought in the increasing disparities of wealth which 
exist between the first and third world. Marx's apparent 
inability to account for the development of the first world 
and the non-development of the third has stimulated this 
nee-Marxist revision of the operation of capitalism on a 
global scale. In a rejection of orthodox Marxism, the 
proponents of nee-Marxist model of development argue that 
the more advanced capitalist countries enjoy a pattern of 
development which is fundamentally different from that 
experienced by recently capitalist nations. They seek an 
explanation of these divergent patterns of development in 
the operation of a capitalist world economy. 
Although Marxist economics has been declared 
"intellectually dead" by some, 1 the provocative conclusions 
of Nee-Marxist theories of development have stimulated a 
renewed debate regarding the impact of imperialism. Both 
Marxists and nee-Marxists working within the classical 
tradition have applied themselves to a re-evaluation of the 
causes of development and non-development. A reflection of 
this current vogue is found in the recent attempt of three 
social scientists to account for the development of New 
Zealand. It is the intention of this thesis to examine the 
nee-Marxist approaches to New Zealand history proposed by 
David Bedggood, Rob Steven and Warwick Armstrong. An 
examination of this nature raises three important issues. 
The first concerns the ability of these nee-Marxist 
1 J. Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p.60. 
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approaches to further our understanding of New Zealand's 
history. A cursory glance at New Zealand's colonial past 
reveals that New Zealand was shaped in important ways by 
outside forces. Dependence on British markets, capital, 
immigration and technology has been a central feature of New 
Zealand I s de.velopment. Even the name this country bears 
implies that New Zealand was "created" rather than 
"discovered" by European expansion into the South Pacific. 
In many ways, New Zealand could be regarded as an outgrowth 
of nineteenth century European imperialism, a Britain of the 
South Pacific. A full understanding of New Zealand's 
colonial past must therefore come to grips with the impact 
which dependence on British imperialism has had on the 
previous 150 years of New Zealand's development. This thesis 
will evaluate the nee-Marxist approaches which claim to 
examine New Zealand history from this important perspective. 
The second important issue concerns a perceived 
shortcoming which exists in New Zealand historiography. This 
shortcoming is identified by W.H. Oliver as the reluctance 
of New Zealand historians to adequately confront the models 
propounded by other social scientists: 
Sinclair is like other New Zealand historians for 
whom fidelity to context and respect for evidence 
count for more than visionary moments and 
theoretical frameworks. Confronted by visionaries 
and theoreticians (commonly social scientists, 
novelists and journalists) historians have 
typically responded by neither evaluating the 
theory nor advancing a counter theory, but by 
showing where the theory does not 'fit the facts•. 
Sinclair's review of David Bedggood's Rich and 
5 
Poor in New Zealand is a good example. 2 
Historians must show where theory does not 'fit the facts' 
and I make no apology for my empirical critique. Although I 
do not always· advance an alternative theory, I will evaluate 
the logical validity of the theoretical formulations which 
are so fundamental to these Nee-Marxist approaches to New 
Zealand history. This thesis is therefore intended as a 
contribution to the scant dialogue which exists between the 
empiricism of historian's and the model building of social 
scientists. 
Finally, this discussion of neo-Marxist approaches to 
New Zealand history is intended as a contribution to the 
wider debate surrounding Wallerstein's neo-Marxist model of 
development. This hopes to place New Zealand history in the 
context of larger debates whose implications extend far 
beyond these islands. This desire to examine New Zealand 
history in the context of wider issues and movements is 
echoed by Graeme Wynn who berates his fellow historians for 
their reluctance to 
connect the story of economic and social 
development in early New Zealand to a broader 
discourse about the nature of new world economies 
and societies. 3 
In his comparative analysis of fiv~ settler societies Donald 
2 W.H. Oliver, Essays in Honour of Keith Sinclair: New 
Zealand Journal of History, vol.21., No.2., 1987, p.11. 
3 G. Wynn, "Reflections on the Writing of New Zealand 
History", New Zealand Journal of History, 1984, p.109. 
oanoon4 identifies similarities which may show how these 
individual societies are part of a broader pattern of 
development. The use of theoretical models by historians 
attempting such comparisons is briefly considered by Denoon. 
Unfortunately, his rejection of nee-Marxist models of 
d,evelopment is conceptually rather thin. This thesis will 
l-0ok in much greater detail at recent accounts of New 
Zealand history which draw on nee-Marxist models. In doing 
so, it will say something about New Zealand history and a 
good deal more about the models. 
, r ' • In· order to deal with these models this thesis is 
<$rgani;zed in the following manner: The first chapter is a 
'~}:itique of the nee-Marxist theory of development espoused 
by Immanuel Wallerstein, whose work has heavily influenced 
6 
recent Marxian discussion of countries like New Zealand. The 
remainder of the thesis is a theoretical and empirical 
examination of writings on New Zealand by Bedggood, Steven 
and Armstrong within the context of Wallerstein's theory and 
the influence of classical Marxism. 
4 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of 
Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, Oxford 
University Press, 1983. 
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Chapter one: WALLERSTEIN AND THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM. 
(-1.1) Marxism, world-Systems Analysis and Development. 
In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels envisaged a 
process where only the socialist revolution would prevent 
capitalism from inheriting the earth. Once capitalism had 
emerged in North Western Europe it would expand 
geographically and replace those pre-capitalist modes of 
production it came into contact with. With the undermining 
or these pre-capitalist societies, capitalism would then set 
in mo~ion a process of development that would duplicate the 
European experience: 
The bourgeoisie ... draws all, even the most 
barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap 
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery 
with which it batters down all Chinese walls, .. It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to 
adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels 
them to introduce what it calls civilization into 
their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. 
In a word, it creates a world after its own image. 1 
In Marx's theory of history, capitalism was one of a 
sequence of stages which marked the advance of human society 
from its hunter-gathering origins to the communist future. 
The transition from one stage to the next is characterized 
by the development of the productive forces as measured by 
the productivity of labour. Although capitalism might drag 
1 K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, Karl Marx Frederick Engels; Collected Works, vol.6., 
London, 1976, p.488. 
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pre-capitalist societies "through blood and dirt 112 it was an 
essentially progressive force. Only capitalism could provide 
the material abundance, through its development of the 
productive forces, which would serve as the basis of the new 
socialist utopia. 
In Marx's view, the forward march of history was 
ultimately irresistible, but it was periodically interrupted 
when the transition from one stage to another was delayed. 
Colonial India provided an example where the resistance 
posed by a pre-capitalist mode of production was sufficient 
to temporarily block its inevitable dissolution by 
capit~lism: 
The obstacles presented by the internal solidity 
and organization of pre-capitalistic national 
modes of production to the corrosive influence of 
commerce are strikingly illustrated in the 
intercourse of the English with India and 
China ... English commerce exerted a revolutionary 
influence on these communities and tore them 
apart ..• And even so, this work of dissolution 
proceeds very gradually. 3 
Lenin shared Marx's conviction that capitalism was a 
progressive force. Both believed capitalism's dissolution of 
pre-capitalist modes of production would act to advance 
societies such as India towards modernity. This expansion 
into pre-capitalist societies was identified by Lenin as the 
"monopoly phase" in the overall development of capitalism. 
The imperati~es of this monopoly stage drove the imperialist 
thrust which saw capitalism taking root in lands outside its 
2 K. Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in 
India", p.137. 
3 K. Marx, Capital, vol.3., pp.333-4. 
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European birthplace. Once implanted in these new lands 
capitalism would develop and flourish, albeit haltingly, 
just as it had in Europe. The export of capital from the 
imperial centre to the colonial periphery was simply one of 
the mechanisms used to further this imperialist expansion. 
This particular mechanism served two functions. Firstly, the 
export of capital offset the supposed declining 
profitability of capitalist enterprises in Europe. Secondly, 
it provided the capital and skills necessary for the 
establishment and development of capitalism in newly 
capitalist colonies such as India. This tendency of capital 
to se~k out and establish itself in those areas where the 
greatest profit was to be found served to slow the 
development of the capital exporting nations while enhancing 
development in the recipient nations: 
The export of capital affects and greatly 
accelerates the development of capitalism in those 
countries to which it is exported, While 
therefore, the export of capital may tend to a 
certain extent to arrest development in the 
capital exporting countries, it can only do so by 
expanding and deepening the further development of 
capitalism throughout the world. 4 
Lenin's theory of imperialism therefore envisaged a time 
when the differences between the levels of development 
attained in the imperial centre and their colonial subjects 
would disappear. 
For revisionists like Wallerstein, factors such as the 
export of capital have the opposite effect to that described 
4 V.I. Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes, vol.1., 
pp.725-26. Reproduced in A. Emmanuel, "White Settler 
Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism", New 
Left Review, 1972, p.22. 
' 
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by-Lenin. Rather than facilitating the development of 
capitalism in underdeveloped countries, "world-systems 
analysis" argues that the export of capital serves to 
benefit the lender and retard the development of the 
recipient. Not only have trade and capital investment failed 
to bring about economic development in the third world but 
they have also obstructed such development from taking 
place. Essentially, Wallerstein questions the traditional 
Marxian notion that capitalist economic development 
inevitably brings material progress to all nations which 
adopt this mode of production. For Wallerstein, the 
develqpment of the productive forces is experienced by only 
a few of the capitalist nations. Wallerstein's sees the 
prosperity of some nations being inextricably tied to the 
poverty of others with "the gain in one region being the 
counterpart to the loss in another". 5 In other words, the 
process of capitalist development is a two edged sword where 
the rich capitalist nations get richer while the poor 
capitalist nations get poorer. Consequently, the work of 
Wallerstein has been labelled 'neo-Marxist' because of its 
fundamental opposition to orthodox Marxist theories of 
imperialism. 
Wallerstein wishes to challenge not only orthodox 
Marxism but what he sees as the "dominant organizing myth of 
the historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth 
5 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System: The Origins 
of Capitalist Agriculture and the European World Economy in 
the Sixteenth Century, vol.1., Academic Press, 1974, p.356. 
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· centuries". 6 We have already seen how Marxism treats history 
as the sometime~ brutal but nevertheless inexorable march of 
progress characterised by the development of the productive 
forces. Wallerstein sees the "Marxist embrace of an 
evolutionary model of progress" as an "enormous trap 11 • 7 In a 
total rejection of the Marxist-Leninist model he concludes: 
It is simply not true that capitalism as an 
historical system has represented progress over 
the various historical systems it has destroyed. 8 
For Wallerstein this progressive model of history advanced 
by Marxists is only telling half the story: "it explains the 
historical progress; but fails utterly to explain the 
histo:r:ical regression. 119 While Marxist historiography 
explains why there has been so much urbanization, 
proletarianization and commodification in some parts of the 
world, it fails to explain why in other areas there has been 
so little. As an antidote to this perceived error 
Wallerstein offers an "alterative organizing myth", 10 which 
attempts to show how capitalism simultaneously develops and 
retards and is necessarily progressive and regressive. 
In order to expose the darker side of capitalist 
economic development, Wallerstein revives the largely 
6 I. Wallerstein, "An Agenda for World-Systems 
Analysis", W.R. Thompson, Contending Approaches to World-
Systems Analysis, Sage Publications, 1983, p.301. 
-
7 I. Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism, Verso Editions, 
1983, p.98. 
8 'b'd l l . 
9 I. Wallerstein, "An Agenda for World-Systems 
Analysis", p.302. 
10 'b 'd l l • 
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discredited notion advanced by some Marxists which 
postulates the absolute immiseration of the world's 
workforce: 
I wish to defend the one Marxist proposition which 
even orthodox Marxists tend to bury in shame, the 
thesis of the absolute (not relative) immiseration 
of the proletariat. 11 
Here Wallerstein argues that the standard of living of the 
world's proletariat will decline so that the sons and 
daughters of the world's workforce will be worse off than 
their parents. This process of immiseration will witness the 
majority of mankind "eat less well", have a "less balanced 
diet", "work unquestionably harder" while "the rate of 
exploitation has escalated very sharply". 12 
To those living in the western world, the claim that 
the coal miners and chimney sweeps of the nineteenth century 
were 'better off' than a car assembly worker of today, has 
not been validated. Wallerstein's theory of absolute 
immiseration, however, instructs us to look at what is 
happening to the world as a whole. It is based upon the 
alleged tendency of the capitalist world economy to 
systematically concentrate the world's wealth in the hands 
of a few, mostly in the developed countries, while 
increasing the poverty amongst the majority of the world's 
population: 
... there has been a growing 'gap' in the 
consumption of the surplus between the upper ten 
to fifteen per cent of the population in the 
11 I. Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism, pp.100-01. 
12 • b. d l l • 
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capitalist world-economy and the rest. 13 
In other words, a small proportion of the world's 
population, comprising both proletarians and bourgeoisie 
located in the west, has prospered while the majority of 
mankind has suffered. Consequently, in different parts of 
the world, there are vast differences in the material reward 
received by workers for their labour. The poorest workers 
are those who live in areas where the proletarianization of 
the workforce has only been partial. The remainder of this 
workforce remain outside the fully proletarianized workforce 
and· therefore forms a 'reserve army' of part-time and 
unemp~oyed labour which act to keep wages to a minimum. The 
existence of this semi-proletarian workforce dooms many 
labourers in the third world to unemployment or 
underemployment. These labourers are left to supplement 
their part-time earnings, if they are lucky enough to have 
employment, by other means. Perhaps the best example of a 
part-time proletarian is the subsistence peasant farmer who 
works for wages in the off-season. As these wages only form 
part of his income they need not represent the total cost of 
his meagre existence. Therefore, the poverty of the majority 
of the world's workforce 
can be explained because many workers in many 
parts of the world are part-time proletarians and 
can be given wages below the physiological minimum 
wage. 14 
13 'b. l ld., p.104. 
14 I. Wallerstein, "World-System Analysis: Theoretical 
and Interpretive Issues", B.H. Kaplan, Social Change in the 
Capitalist World Economy, Sage Publications, 1978, p.227. 
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The maintenance of a semi-proletarian workforce enables 
capitalists to pay their workers less than if they were 
fully proletarianized as the employers do not have to bear 
the total cost of the reproduction of labour. In this way, 
the existence of non-proletarian labour 
reduces the global cost of labour by allowing the 
traditional sectors to bear the lifetime costs of 
childhood and old-age maintenance of large sectors 
of cash-crop or urban workers. 15 
The crucial point is that capitalist economic development 
does not bring proletarianization to all the world's labour 
force. Unlike Marx and Lenin, Wallerstein argues that this 
is due not to the resistance of pre-capitalist modes of 
production but to the fact that the existence of non-
proletarian labour is advantageous to capitalism: 
The existence of non-proletarianized labour ... is 
quite essential for the optimization of 
opportunities for overall profit in a capitalist 
world-market. 16 
The continued existence of a non-proletarian labour is 
precisely what enables workers in the developed countries to 
receive greater payment for their labour than their 
counterparts in the third world. As a consequence of this 
international disparity in the cost of labour, any trade 
which occurs between high wage and low wage areas inevitably 
results in "unequal exchange1117 • It is through this mechanism 
of "unequal exchange" that the capitalist world economy 
15 ibid. 
16 I. Wallerstein, "From Feudalism to Capitalism: 
Transition or Transitions?", Social Forces, Dec 1976, p.279. 
17 For a more detailed explanation of "unequal exchange" 
see section (1.3) below. 
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manages to drain the surplus created in the poor countries 
and concentrate that wealth in the hands of a few rich 
nations. 
It is interesting to note that Wallerstein's thesis of 
absolute immiseration comes with no empirical verification. 
It is merely asserted. As we shall see, the mechanism of 
"unequal exchange" used to explain the increasing mal-
distribution of wealth within the capitalist world-system is 
simply inadequate. Unfortunately, the lack of defensible 
causal mechanisms18 allows Wallerstein to paint only a lurid 
picture of underdeveloped capitalism without offering any 
usefu~ analysis of its cause. Wallerstein believes that the 
failure of Marxism and other 'progressive' models to account 
for the inability of capitalism to bring development to the 
third world justifies his new "metahistory": 
The justification therefore for our metahistory 
comes neither from the data it generates nor from 
the null hypotheses it supports nor from the 
analysis it provokes. Its justification derives 
from its ability to respond comprehensively to the 
existing continuing real social puzzles that 
people encounter and of which they have become 
conscious. It is, in fact, precisely the reality 
of the ever-increasing historical disparities of 
development that has called into question the old 
organizing myths. 19 
The crux of Wallerstein's opposition to orthodox Marxism is 
located in the disturbing fact that among countries which 
employ wage labour there is a considerable variation in the 
18 These inadequate causal mechanisms will be discussed 
in section (1.3) below. 
19 I. Wallerstein, "Economic Theories and Historical 
Disparities of Development", Economic Theory and History, 
vol.1., 1982, p.24. 
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level of development achieved by their respective productive 
forces. Indeed, some of the least advanced capitalist 
countries exhibit archaic productive processes that are 
closer to those utilized by feudal Europe. This apparent 
anomaly in the classical Marxist formulation provides much 
of the basis for revisionists like Wallerstein, who doubt 
the ability of Marxism to understand the development of 
capitalism in the third world. The question remains however, 
can Wallerstein's "alternative organizing myth" serve our 
understanding any better? 
As a preliminary examination of Wallerstein's account, 
we will begin by analyzing the nature of the "ever 
increasing historical disparities of development". When 
expressed in terms of per-capita gross national product, the 
gap which exists between rich and poor nations is indeed 
growing larger. To this must be added a crucial 
qualification: the rate at which the gap is increasingly 
slowing down. Between 1750 and 1913, the developed world's 
per capita GNP rose by 260% while the third world's actually 
declined. 20 Although this tendency has not been reversed the 
rate of its increase has markedly slowed. Between 1950 and 
1980 the per capita GNP of the developed world grew by 184%. 
Over the same period, the third world experienced an 
• 21 important but much less spectacular growth rate of 87%. 
20 P. Bairoch, "Historical Roots of Underdevelopment", 
W. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel, Imperialism and After: 
Continuities and Discontinuities, Allen and Unwin, 1986, 
p.203. 
21 . b. d l l . 
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" 'rijhough Wallerstein is correct to identify this growing gap 
;~etween rich and poor, the unprecedented period of growth in 
::\%.he post war period raises doubts as to whether such 
:a:isparities of wealth will remain a permanent feature of 
global capitalism. The existence of a division between rich 
and poor nations in the long-term future is also called into 
question when we consider the recent expansion of the 
manufacturing sector in the third world. As Wallerstein 
associates manufacturing with wealth and the production of 
raw materials with poverty, 22 we would expect the third 
wqrld's share of global manufacturing to show a decline in 
line with its declining share of the world's wealth. A 
striking confirmation of this de-industrialization thesis 
saw the third world's share of global manufacturing falling 
from 73% of the total in 1750 to an all time low of 7% in 
1913. 23 The decline is not as terminal as it seems. The third 
world's decline has been dramatically arrested in the post 
war period. Manufacturing in the third world has experienced 
an explosive growth rate of 800% between 1950 and 1980. 24 
Such improvements have resulted in the third world now 
22 The core states of the capitalist world economy "are 
zones in which are concentrated high profit, high 
technology, high wage, diversified production". Conversely, 
the peripheral areas of the capitalist world economy are 
characterized by "low profit, low technology, low wage, less 
diversified production". See: I. Wallerstein, "Semi-
Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis", 
Theory and History, vol.3., 1976, p.462. 
23 P. Bairoch, "Historical Roots of Underdevelopment", 
p.199. 
24 'b'd l l • 
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producing 12% of global manufacturing. 25 
Wallerstein's description of global capitalism in terms 
of "ever increasing historical disparities of development" 
must also be regarded with apprehension when we consider the 
spread of industrial and post-industrial development 
throughout the world. The revolutionizing of production 
associated with industrial development began in just one 
country, Britain. By the early twentieth century, industrial 
development was also revolutionizing production in many 
European counties, the United States and Japan. The spread 
of industrial and post-industrial development has continued 
right ~p to the present day. Countries which were considered 
part of the third world as recently as 1950 have presently 
achieved levels of development which undoubtedly places them 
amongst the developed world. The so-called "four dragons" of 
Asia: namely Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, 
provide excellent examples of this phenomenon. 
The verdict is by no means final. The post-war period, 
however, seems to suggest that the existence of "ever-
increasing historical disparities of development" may not 
remain a permanent feature of global capitalism. On the 
basis of the trends we have noted above, future development 
in the third world may vindicate the optimism of Marx rather 
than the pessimism of Wallerstein. As the rest of this 
discussion will show, Wallerstein's inability to account for 
the causes of development calls into further doubt his 
ability to credibly explain, let alone predict, changes in 
2s ibid. 
19 
the world economy. 
(1.2) Surplus Transfer and Development. 
This comparison of Marxist and nee-Marxist theories of 
capitalist economic development inevitably raises the 
question of whether the "capitalism" described by both is 
the same thing. If we examine how Marx and Wallerstein 
define this crucial term fundamental differences will 
emerge .. For Marx, capitalism is a mode of production which 
is defined'by two essential features. Firstly, it is a 
system of production for the market. Secondly, it is a 
system of relations of production characterized by the use 
of wage labour. In contrast, Wallerstein regards the 
presence or absence of wage labour as irrelevant. Capitalism 
is a mode of exchange whose only defining characteristic is 
the production of commodities for the market: 
... the essential feature of a capitalist world 
economy ... is production for sale in a market in 
which the object is to realize the maximum 
profit. 26 
Wallerstein specifically excludes relations of production 
from his definition of capitalism. 
Wallerstein's insistence that capitalism is a mode of 
exchange has caused him to argue that the transfer of 
surplus within the capitalist world economy has played a 
crucial role in determining the types of development 
26 I. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the 
World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", 
I. Wallerstein, Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, p.15. 
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experienced by its constituent parts. Indeed, it was the 
11 flow of surplus which enabled the capitalist system to come 
into existence. 1127 To approach the problem from another 
angle, Wallerstein has looked at the disparities of 
development which exist between the core and the periphery 
and incorrectly assumed that there is a link between them. 
Such a link is presumed to reside in the flow of surplus 
which is extracted from the periphery, transported along the 
"conveyor-belt 1128 of the semi-periphery and concentrated in 
the co~e. Within this system of surplus transfer, the 
"development" of the core is both the result and the cause 
of the 11 underdevelopment 1129 of the periphery. Put bluntly, 
"the gain in one region is the counterpart of the loss in 
another. 1130 
The incorporation of the periphery into this system of 
exploitative exchange relations provided the west European 
core with the capital, among other things, which it required 
in order to industrialize: 
p.87. 
... the inclusion of eastern Europe and Hispanic 
America into the European world-economy in the 
sixteenth century not only provided capital 
(through booty and high profit margins) but also 
27 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
28 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Mercantilism 
and the Consolidation of the European World Economy 1600-
1750, vol.2., Academic Press, 1980, p.241. 
29 I. Wallerstein, "Underdevelopment and Phase B: Effect 
of Seventeenth Century Stagnation on Core and Periphery of 
the European World Economy", W.L. Goldfrank, The World-
System of Capitalism, Beverly Hills, 1979, p.72. 
30 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
p.356. 
21 
liberated some labour in the core areas for 
' ' t' ' th 31 specializa ion in o er areas. 
This linkage of core and periphery within a system of 
surplus transfer makes two assumptions. Firstly, a flow of 
surplus from the periphery to the core is necessary if the 
core is to experience development. Secondly, the periphery 
must specialize in the production of raw materials if the 
core is to become increasingly oriented towards the 
production of manufactured goods. Overall, the development 
of western Europe was only made possible by the contribution 
of the pe~iphery. 
I will argue that Wallerstein's explanation of the 
development of the core in terms of a transfer of surplus is 
flawed as a result of his incorrect assumptions regarding 
the magnitude and role of the commerce between the core and 
the periphery. I will show that among the totality of 
factors which account for the development of the core, 
commerce with the periphery is not especially significant. 
The conclusion is unmistakable, the development of the core 
does not require the underdevelopment of the periphery. In a 
study of the contribution of the periphery to Europe's 
economic development, Patrick O'Brien concludes that 
the commerce between western Europe and regions at 
the periphery of the international economy forms 
an insignificant part of the explanation for the 
accelerated rate of economic growth experienced by 
the core after 1750.~ 
31 'b. d ii., p.102. 
32 P. o' Brien, "European Economic Development: The 
Contribution of the Periphery", Economic History Review, 
2nd. series, vol.35., 1982. p.3. 
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In an expansion of this argument, we will look at four major 
aspects of the "commerce" that took place between the core 
and periphery. 
The first examines the supposedly vital role played by 
the periphery as a source of ~aw materials to the industries 
of the core. Despite arguments which view the acquisition of 
raw materials as being one of the imperatives of 
imperialis~, such a requirement is only a very recent 
feature of capitalism in developed nations. As late as the 
1930 1 s the self-sufficiency of the developed world was 
remarkable with locally mined and processed raw materials 
accounting for between 93-96% of the value of total 
consumption. 33 By some estimates, the industrialized world 
has only begun to depend on the third world as a source of 
raw materials since 1955. 34 Until then "the developed 
countries were able to reach a very high level of 
industrialization on the basis of local raw materials 11 • 35 In 
other words, the mere existence of a raw material producing 
periphery does not imply that it was vital to the 
manufacturing of the west. 
The second aspect of this commercial relationship 
supposedly involves the periphery's role as a vital market 
for the manufactured goods produced by the core. 
Wallerstein's argument appears to have some limited validity 
33 P. Bairoch, "Historical Roots of Economic 
Underdevelopment", p. 210. 
34 'b, d l l • 
35 'b, d l l • 
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when we consider how the non-developed world absorbed 18% of 
36 
all European exports between 1800 and 1939. It would appear 
that the periphery provided a significant market for 
European goods, most of which were manufactured. Viewed in 
the context of total Europepn output, however, the 
significance of the non-developed world as a market is 
greatly diminished. During the same period, exports to the 
third world represented a meagre 1.7% of Europe's GNP. 37 If 
we look at the totality of economic activity the role of 
foreign trade is dwarfed by the stimulus provided by "home 
demand". In short, the role of the periphery as a market was 
an insignificant factor when accounting for the causes of 
economic development in the core. 
The third aspect of this commerce involves the role 
played by the profits accruing to the core powers from trade 
with the periphery. Wallerstein attempts to argue that these 
profits provided vital capital which was required to 'kick 
start• the first stages of the industrial revolution. Once 
again, Wallerstein overestimates the importance of the 
foreign trade as an engine of growth. During the early 
stages of industrialization the capital derived from all 
foreign trade amounted to between 6% and 8% of the total 
investments made in European industry. 38 If we consider that 
the periphery accounted for less than one fifth of the 
36 'b'd l l • 
37 'b'd l l • 
38 ibid., p. 213. 
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core's international trade, 39 the profits derived from trade 
with the periphery could not have provided more than 2% of 
the total capital required. 
The fourth aspect involves the role ostensibly played 
by the trade of commodities between the core and the 
periphery, which is said to have allowed a specialization of 
occupational tasks to come into existence. Wallerstein 
explains that the periphery's role as the 'breadbasket' of 
the world allowed labour in the core to be freed from 
agriculture and move into the nascent industrial sector. 
Without the periphery, British agriculture would have been 
unable to spare the workers needed by the rapidly expanding 
textile industry. Such a conception of the role of trade 
completely ignores the fact that the British industrial 
revolution was based upon a prior and contemporaneous 
agricultural revolution. Enormous improvements in the 
productivity of the agricultural sector allowed labour to 
flow from the rural areas into the new industrial cities of 
Lancashire. Britain was by no means an exceptional case. 
Gains made in agricultural productivity across Europe and 
the United States allowed labour to flow into the industrial 
sector. O'Brien concludes that 
Trade between the continents simply allowed 
Europeans to escape from a fixed endowment of 
natural resources and to consume a mix of exotic 
commodities which could not be grown or mined in 
western Europe. 40 
39 'b'd l l ., p.210. 
40 P. o' Brien, "European Economic Development: The 
Contribution of the Periphery", p.10. 
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The conclusion is unmistakable: the contribution of the 
periphery to the process of economic development in the core 
before 1939 was insignificant. The mere fact that the 
periphery was tied up in the expanding sphere of the 
capitalist world-system does not imply that the development 
of the core was inexplicable without reference to the 
underdevelopment of the periphery. If there is such an 
entity as the capitalist world economy it is certainly not, 
as Wallerstein implies, a zero-sum game with "the gain of 
one region being the counterpart of the loss in another. 1141 
The story of European economic development is explicable 
almost entirely in terms of factors such as capital and 
technology that were to be found in the core: 
Except for a restricted range of examples, growth, 
stagnation and decay everywhere in Western Europe 
can be explained mainly by reference to endogenous 
forces. 42 
Wallerstein rejects arguments which stress the relative 
unimportance of the periphery to the development of the core 
by doubting the validity of the figures. He argues that 
these figures underestimate the value of products produced 
by the periphery by failing to recognize the amount of 
"labour power" which is contained within this merchandise. 
Wallerstein concludes that such figures 
are a heavily biased subsample, one which hides a 
good deal of the real labour-power entering into 
what finally emerges in the world market as 
41 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
p.356. 
42
• P. O'Brien, "European Economic Development: The 
Contribution of the Periphery", p.18. 
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'merchandise ' . 43 
In other words, the figures presented by economic historians 
fail to understand the nature of the value of the 
commodities which are exchanged through international trade. 
In an effort to save his thesis that t_he transfer of surplus 
is vital to the development of the core and the under-
development of the periphery, Wallerstein is forced to 
resort to an untenable theory of exploitation. As the 
following section will show, Wallerstein fails in his 
attempt to show how "unequal exchange" allows the core to 
benefit from the exploitation of the periphery. 
(1.3) Exploitation and the Modern World-system. 
As we have already seen, Wallerstein claims that the 
capitalist world economy is an exploitative system of 
exchange relations which transfers surplus from the 
periphery to the core. The central mechanism through which 
this international exploitation operates is "unequal 
exchange". For any form of unequal exchange to occur, values 
must diverge from prices so that commodities of different 
value exchange for the same price. Only in this way can a 
trading partner be said to gain at the expense of another 
through a system of unequal exchange. Wallerstein's theory 
of unequal exchange argues that different amounts of "labour 
power" have been expended to produce commodities which are 
43 I. Wallerstein, "European Economic Development: A 
Comment on O'Brien", Economic History Review, vol.36., 1983, 
p. 581. 
exchanged at the same price. In short, unequal exchange 
involves a transfer of value when one trading partner 
receives more labour power in exchange for less: 
... unequal exchange ... is the consequence of the 
fact that more labour power has gone into 
producing the value exchanged in one area than 
another. 4 
The modernity of production in the core and the backward-
ness of production in the periphery form the basis upon 
which the core benefits from unequal exchange to the 
detriment of the periphery: 
•.. a capitalist world economy essentially rewards 
accumulated capital, including human capital, at a 
higher rate than "raw" labour power. 45 
Here Wallerstein argues that international trade enables 
more highly capitalized, technically advanced and labour 
efficient countries located in the core, to extract value 
(in the form of labour power) from more labour intensive 
ones located in the periphery. 
Wallerstein's theory of unequal exchange is therefore 
based on a theory in which the labour content of a commodity 
determines its value. In a crucial omission, Wallerstein 
does not provide an explanation of how the value of a 
commodity is determined by its labour content. Fortunately, 
much of the controversy surrounding Marxist economics has 
dealt with the problems arising from a theory of value 
44 I. Wallerstein, "World-System Analysis: Theoretical 
and Interpretive Issues", p.223. 
45 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
p.350. 
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predicated on labour input. Drawing on the Marxist debate, 46 
my rejection of Wallerstein's theory of unequal exchange is 
based upon the inadequacy of any labour theory of value. 
The labour theory of value lies at the heart of the 
Marxist attempt to explain the nature and consequences of 
commodity exchange. In his desire to formulate a consistent 
theory of exchange Marx searched for a property shared by 
all commodities. He incorrectly concluded that only one such 
property existed. The identification of labour input as that 
unique property accounts for his failure to identify 
"marginal utility" as an equally valid basis for a 
consistent theory of exchange. The theory of marginal 
utility claims that all commodities are comparable on the 
basis that they are all subject to varying degrees of 
desirability on the part of the consumer. This failure to 
identify other properties besides labour input as being 
common to all commodities lies at the heart of the failure 
of the labour of value as an explanation of commodity 
exchange. 
This initial failure is compounded by the second 
assumption: that labour is the only factor of production 
capable of adding value to raw materials and the machinery 
used to work them. This assumption hopes to explain why, 
given the availability of the means of production, the 
finished product has a greater value than the raw materials. 
46 An especially good summary of some recent 
developments in the debate on the labour theory of value is 
to be found in I. Steedman, et al, The Value Controversy, 
Verso Editions, 1981. 
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Both these assumptions form the basis of the labour theory 
of value which simply states that value is determined by 
socially necessary labour time. This rather jargonistic 
definition of value simply refers to the labour time 
required to produce a commodity under standard conditions of 
labour productivity, that is, the degree of skill, 
technology and intensity of labour prevalent in a particular 
society. 
Using the labour theory of value as their basis, Marxists 
attempt to explain the origins of profit. Although I will 
show how this attempt ends in failure, the explanation 
proceeds in the following manner. Under capitalism, labour 
power is a commodity which the worker sells to the 
capitalist in return for wages. Having purchased this labour 
power the capitalist employs it in the production of 
commodities which are sold on the market. In order for 
capitalists to realize a profit they must buy labour power 
at a value which is lower than the amount of value that 
labour power creates. The profit corresponds to the 
difference between the value created by workers' labour and 
the payment (wages) they receive in return. Expressed in 
such terms, the profit accruing to capital is dependant on 
the amount of surplus labour which can be squeezed from each 
worker. Some Marxists now conclude that capitalism exploits 
the worker by appropriating some of the value which was 
created by the worker. 
It will be my contention that this explanation of the 
origins of profit, and hence exploitation, cannot be derived 
from the labour theory of value. 47 I will show how value 
defined as socially necessary labour time specifically 
precludes the charge of exploitation which this account of 
profit levels at capitalism. 
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Contrary to appearances, the labour theory of value does 
not offer any support to this charge of exploitation, as 
value is determined by factors other than socially necessary 
labour time. Monopoly ownership of the means of production 
causes the value of a commodity to rise.above the value it 
would normally reach if competing firms produced a similar 
commodity. It would therefore appear that patterns of 
ownership could determine the value of a commodity. Marxists 
respond to this criticism of the labour theory of value by 
arguing that patterns of ownership can only affect the price 
of a commodity and therefore the amount of value the owners 
can get their hands on. No part of the value they receive is 
created by ownership. This defence of the labour theory of 
value has employed an interesting subterfuge where the 
original definition of value as socially necessary labour 
has shifted to one where value is created by labour. Even 
this revised formulation of the labour theory of value is 
incapable of supporting a charge of exploitation as·the 
statement, that labour is created by value, is also open to 
damning criticism. 48 If we recall the notion of "marginal 
47 Here I am relying on the arguments found in G.A. 
Cohen, "The Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of 
Exploitation", I. Steedman et al, The Value Controversy, 
Verso Editions, 1981, pp.202-223. 
~Amore complete rejection of the claim that "labour 
creates value'' is found in section 3.3 below. 
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utility", a factor often overlooked by Marxists, it can be 
argued that the extent of the consumers desire for a product 
can affect its value. Value may be deemed to be created by 
desire and not by labour. Cohen correctly concludes that the 
logical corollary to this highlights the absurdity of the 
claim that labour creates value: 49 
If labour's creation of value would give the labourer 
a claim to value because he had created it, then so 
would the desirer's creation of value give him a claim 
on that basis ... The suggestion is absurd. 50 
As a general conclusion, the labour theory of value in any 
form is an inadequate explanation of commodity exchange. 
With regard to the labour input, all that can be concluded 
is that labour creates commodities which have value, not 
value itself. Other factors such as risk capital and 
entrepreneurial skills also determine the value of 
commodities. 
The point is this. The labour theory of value in any form 
is an inadequate explanation of the exploitation which 
Marxist's claim is a central feature of capitalism. By 
defining the value of a commodity in terms of labour input 
it is illogical to argue that exploitation occurs when 
capitalists receive, as profit, some of the value created by 
workers. In exactly the same way, Wallerstein is unable to 
argue that exploitation occurs because international trade 
w 11 ••• a man's desire for something cannot be a reason 
for his receiving it on the ground that his desire for it 
enhances its value, even if it does enhance its value. That 
ground is surely unintelligible." G.A. Cohen, "The Labour 
Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation", p.220. 
so Ibid. 
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allows the core countries to extract, as profit, some of the 
labour power produced in the periphery. There is no validity 
to his claim that the exploitation of the periphery by the 
core is the result of an unequal exchange of labour power. 
The fact that more labour power has been expended to produce 
a commodity exchanged for a commodity which contains less 
does not show that value is being transferred from one 
producer to another. Wallerstein's theory of unequal 
exchange can only show that commodities which exchange at 
the same price are often produced under varying degrees of 
labour productivity. The employment of labour saving 
technology does not enable the more efficient producer to 
exploit the less efficient one. 
(1.4) The Problem of the Semi-Periphery. 
In the course of our discussion we have seen how 
Wallerstein's capitalist world economy is characterised by 
unequal exchange which acts to transfer surplus from the 
periphery to the core. This system of international 
exploitation then precipitates the development of the core 
and the underdevelopment of the periphery. Essentially, 
Wallerstein's model of economic development is bi-polar with 
the "gains in one region being the counterpart to the loss 
in another11 • 51 This final section will examine the way in 
which the semi-periphery sits within the bi-polar nature of 
51 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol.1., 
p.356. 
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wallerstein's capitalist world economy. 
Wallerstein assigns to the semi-periphery an intermediary 
position within the capitalist world economy's system of ex-
ploitative exchange relations. While the core exploits, and 
the periphery is exploited, the semi-periphery falls 
somewhere in between the two as "both the exploiter and the 
exploited". 52 In a clarification of this intermediary 
position Wallerstein explains how "the semi-periphery 
represents a midway point on a continuum running from the 
core to the periphery. 1153 If we are to locate the 
characteristics which define the semi-periphery, we must 
first examine the set of criteria which defines that 
continuum. 
Wallerstein defines a number of criteria upon which the 
core and periphery occupy opposite ends of the same 
spectrum. Accordingly, the semi-periphery is located 
somewhere in the middle of this spectrum "in terms of the 
kinds of product it exports and in terms of the wage levels 
and profit margins it knows. 1154 Broadly speaking, Wallerstein 
defines the core as carrying out "high profit, high 
technology, high wage, diversified production". Conversely, 
52 I. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the 
World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", 
I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, p.23. 
53 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
p.102-03. 
54 I. Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent 
World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within 
the Capitalist World Economy", I. Wallerstein, The 
Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1979, 
p.71. 
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the periphery carries out "low profit, low technology, low 
wage, less diversified production 11 • 55 In accordance with its 
intermediary position we would expect the semi-periphery to 
export a partially diversified range of goods which embody 
profit margins, wage levels and methods of production that 
lie between the highs and lows mapped out by the core and 
periphery. 
While it is possible to differentiate between the core 
and periphery on a number of criteria such as wealth, output 
and growth rates, it is not possible to make any useful 
generalizations about the group of nations which Wallerstein 
defines as semi-peripheral. In a total rejection of this 
intermediary category I will show how the semi-periphery 
does not, on any set of criteria, form a distinct group of 
nations which lie between the core and periphery. The 
nations I will use to prove the non-existence of a semi-
periphery have all been specifically named by Wallerstein as 
members of this group. 56 Furthermore, I have chosen 
statistics whose dates are close to the date at which 
55 I. Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the 
Contemporary World Crisis", p.462. 
56 The semi-periphery includes: "Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela, possibly Chile and Cuba. It includes 
the whole outer rim of Europe: the southern tier of 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece; most of eastern Europe; 
parts of the northern tier such as Norway and Finland. It 
includes a series of Arab states; Algeria, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia; also Israel. It includes in Africa at least Nigeria 
and Zaire, and in Asia, Turkey, Iran, India, Indonesia, 
China, Korea and Vietnam. And it includes the old white 
commonwealth: Canada, Australia, South Africa and possibly 
New Zealand." 
I. Wallerstein, (1976), "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the 
Contemporary World Crisis", p.465. 
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wallerstein published his list of semi-peripheral countries. 
If we examine the rates of economic growth achieved by 
certain members of the semi-periphery from 1960 to 1972 we 
will find they are spread right across the spectrum from the 
highest to the lowest. Saudi Arabia achieved the third 
highest growth rate in the world at 113% while India was 
amongst the lowest at 17%. 57 Other members of the semi-
periphery such as New Zealand and Australia achieved growth 
rates which were almost identical to core nations such as 
Britain and the U.S. 
If we examine the levels of per capita wealth enjoyed by 
members of the semi-periphery in 1972, huge disparities will 
become apparent. Canada was the third richest country in the 
world with a per capita GNP of $3260 while India was one of 
the poorest with a per capita income of $89. 58 Once again, 
most members of the core and periphery fell within this huge 
range mapped out by the semi-periphery. Consequently, some 
semi-peripheral nations experienced a level of affluence 
that should have placed them in the core while others belong 
firmly in the periphery. In 1972 New Zealand had a per 
capita GNP of $1918 while Britain was only marginally 
wealthier at $1976. 59 
A similar picture emerges if we look at the percentage of 
the population who are engaged in agricultural production. 
57 B. Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, New 
Left Books, 1980, p.196. 
58 B. Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist 
Industrialization" New Left Review, No.81., 1973, pp.8-9. 
59 ibid. 
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As recently as 1970 Turkey had one of the highest rates of 
employment in agriculture at 77% while Australia was amongst 
the lowest at 8%. 60 Once again, there exists a huge disparity 
among nations of the semi-periphery with Turkey belonging 
more properly in the periphery and Australia in the core. 
If we examine manufacturing output expressed as a per-
centage of total domestic output the non-existence of the 
semi-periphery will be demonstrated once again. In 1966 
Nigeria's manufacturing sector accounted for 6% of her total 
output while 1969 saw 31% of Canada's output appear in the 
form of manufactured goods. 61 Therefore, Nigeria's 
manufacturing output places her firmly in the periphery 
while Canada's manufacturing sector contributed more to its 
total output than that of the U.S. The few examples we have 
looked at suggest that there is little validity in comparing 
the productive processes of semi-peripheral nations like 
China and Vietnam with those of Australia and New Zealand. 
While it is possible to define the existence of the core and 
periphery on the basis of a set of mutually exclusive 
criteria, such as wealth, it is impossible to make any 
useful generalizations about the group of nations which is 
said to belong to the semi-periphery. The group of nations 
which Wallerstein maintains belong to the semi-periphery in 
fact conform no more to his definition of the semi-periphery 
60 J.W. Kendrick and B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in 
Productivity Measurement and Analysis, University of Chicago 
Press, 1980, pp.580-81. 
61 B. Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist 
Industrialization", pp.8-9. 
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than other nations. 
It appears that Wallerstein has two poorly conceived 
criteria in mind when he specifies which nations belong in 
the semi-periphery. These criteria regard the presence of 
heavy industry and/or oil wealth as the basis for a nations 
membership of this amorphous group. 62 According to 
Wallerstein's criteria, the semi-periphery covers nations as 
disparate as China, India and Canada on the basis of their 
heavy industry, and Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Indonesia on 
the basis of 'their oil wealth. The inability to fulfil these 
requirements would explain why Wallerstein regards New 
Zealand's membership of the semi-periphery as problematic. 63 
Indeed the problem posed by the "old white commonwealth" is 
that its wealth was built on agriculture and in the case of 
New Zealand still is. It will be my contention that the 
creation of the semi-periphery was undertaken in order to 
remove difficult cases like the members of the "old white 
commonwealth" from Wallerstein's core-periphery schema. 
Within Wallerstein's essentially bi-polar model of 
development the semi-periphery functions as both "the 
exploiter and the exploited". 64 Consequently, the semi-
periphery facilitates the transfer of surplus from the 
62 My thanks to Dr. Chris Connolly for pointing this 
out. 
~ If we recall Wallerstein's list of semi-peripheral 
nations, "it includes the old white commonwealth: Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, and possibly New Zealand." See I. 
Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary 
World Crisis", p.465. 
64 I. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the 
World Capitalist System", p.23. 
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periphery to the core by acting as a "conveyor belt of 
surplus value. 1165 The pattern of trade which characterized 
the "old white commonwealth", however, precluded these 
nations from acting as an international middleman. 66 Since 
their incorporation into the world economy, Australia and 
New Zealand have enjoyed preferential trading arrangements 
with Britain which allowed them to export primary products 
in exchange for manufactured goods. Within this network of 
exchange, any trade which existed between Australasia and 
the underdeveloped world was relatively non-existent. 
Contrary to Wallerstein's argument, the nature and direction 
of the trade engaged by Australia and New Zealand precludes 
these semi-peripheral countries from acting as the "conveyor 
belts" of surplus value. 
In an implicit admission of the problematic economic role 
played by the semi-periphery, Wallerstein concludes that 
"the semi-periphery is then assigned as it were an economic 
role, but the reason is less economical than political. 1167 In 
this capacity as both exploiter and exploited the semi-
periphery supposedly acts to keep the core-periphery 
structure of the capitalist world economy from moving 
towards excessive polarization. The semi-periphery acts to 
65 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.2., 
p. 241. 
66 Semi-Peripheral countries "act as a peripheral zone 
for core countries and in part they act as a core country or 
peripheral areas." See: I. Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral 
Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis", p.463. 
67 I. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the 
Capitalist World System", p.23. 
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partially deflect the political pressures which groups 
primarily located in peripheral areas might otherwise 
direct against core states and the groups which 
operate within and through their state machineries. 68 
Despite Wallerstein's assurances to the contrary, 69 the semi-
periphery is merely a "residual category" which serves to 
remove difficult cases like New Zealand from his essentially 
bi-polar system of surplus transfer. 
The difficulties presented by countries like New Zealand 
stems from their reluctance to conform to the contours 
formed by the three zones of Wallerstein's capitalist world 
economy. New Zealand and other members of the "old white 
commonwealth" exhibit an unusual amalgam of characteristics 
which do not allow them to fit comfortably within either the 
core or the periphery. 
Since New Zealand became incorporated into the world 
economy it has exported a narrow range of primary products 
to an even smaller range of markets. As recently as 1965 the 
U.K. accounted for 45% of New Zealand's exports and 53% of 
its imports. By 1985, however, these figures had fallen to 
9% in both categories. 70 This extremely low level of 
diversification in 1965 helped New Zealand to achieve a high 
level of affluence that was normally associated with the 
more mature capitalist nations such as Britain. In direct 
68 I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., 
p.350. 
$ "The semi-periphery, however, is not an artifice of 
statistical cutting points, nor is it a residual category." 
see I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol.1., p.349. 
70 S. Birks and s. Chatterjee, The New Zealand Economy: 
Issues and Policies, Dunmore Press, 1988 p.194. 
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contrast to the implications of world systems analysis, New 
Zealand's peripheral-type trade profile enabled her to enjoy 
core-like levels of affluence. In continued defiance of 
wallerstein's model, New Zealand's increasingly diversified 
trade profile has been accompanied by her declining wealth 
relative to the rest of the world. Indeed, one of 
Wallerstein's critics concludes that 
Had he [Wallerstein] been a specialist on modern 
Australia or New Zealand, he might have come to 
different conclusions, for these are excellent ex-
amples of the way dependent primary producing regions 
can launch themselves by trade with more developed 
nations into an orbit of continuous growth. 71 
I have argued that Wallerstein's model of 'partial' 
development does not account for the experience of the semi-
periphery in general or New Zealand in particular. What is 
apparent from this critique of Wallerstein is that the 
nature of New Zealand's development was certainly not the 
result of its playing an intermediary role in a world system 
which acted to transfer surplus from the periphery to the 
core. My objection to this semi-peripheral role being cast 
for New Zealand is based on three points. The first notes 
how the simple transfer of surplus cannot possib,ly account 
for certain types of development. 72 As we have already seen, 
it is certainly not the case that development is the result 
of the "successful expropriation of the world surplus". 73 My 
71 T.C Smout, "Scotland and England: Is Dependence a 
Symptom or a Cause of Underdevelopment?", Review, vol.3., 
No.4., 1980, p.603. 
n Refer to section (1.2) above. 
73 I. Wallerstein, "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the 
Contemporary World Crisis", p.466. 
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second objection is based on the inability of Wallerstein's 
theory of unequal exchange to account for a transfer of 
surplus. 74 Without a viable mechanism to transfer this 
expropriated surplus Wallerstein is unable account for the 
divergent paths of development experienced by the three 
zones of his capitalist world economy. The third notes how 
New Zealand's pattern of trade precludes her from acting as 
a conveyor belt of surplus value by playing an intermediary 
role in trade between the core and periphery. 
This chapter has highlighted a crucial challenge 
presented by nations like New Zealand to world systems 
analysis. The remainder of this thesis will examine the his-
toriography based on the theories of development propounded 
by Wallerstein, which attempt to account for the development 
of New Zealand. 
~ Refer to section (1.3) above. 
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Chapter two: BEDGGOOD AND THE SEMI-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEW ZEALAND. 
(2.1) New Zealand and the Modern World system. 
David Bedggood explains the development of New Zealand 
by postulating the existence of a world-wide system of 
production and exchange. This approach a~;sumes that a 
country's development can only be understood if it is viewed 
in the context of the world system in which it evolved. 
Consequently, Bedggood's explanation for the development of 
New Zealand begins with an analysis of the "modern world 
system": 
The approach adopted in this book treats New 
Zealand society as part of world society - 'the 
modern world system•. 1 
The similarities between Bedggood and Wallerstein do not end 
with each postulating the existence of a global network 
which they name the "modern world system". The origins and 
functions of Bedggood's modern world system are also 
identical to Wallerstein's. 
The birth of Bedggood's modern world system coincided 
with the rise of capitalism in northwestern Europe. This 
world system then expanded from its European core to 
incorporate all non-capitalist societies. With the 
geographical expansion of the modern world system, 
production was increasingly organized on a global scale. As 
1 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, George Allen and Unwin, 
1980, p.17. . 
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a consequence of this global scale of production different 
states within the modern world system began to specialize in 
the production of a certain range of commodities. 
Specialization begot specialization and the modern world 
system evolved into an "international division of labour". 2 
Accordingly, those non-capitalist societies which were 
swallowed up by the modern world system were assigned 
specific roles within this "expanding division of labour": 
As the world system developed, it incorporated 
non-capitalist economies, fitting them into the 
expanding division of labour as producers of 
particular commodities. 3 
This expanding division of labour divided the modern 
world system into an imperial centre which specialized in 
manufacturing and a colonial periphery which produced raw 
materials. These distinct roles allowed the "imperial power" 
and the "colony" to develop as different yet complementary 
parts of this international system of production and 
exchange: 
The role of a colony is to supply relatively 
cheap raw materials and labour power to an 
imperial power whose function it is to import raw 
materials from colonies, process them, and export 
some finished products back to the colonies. 4 
These different roles within the "international division of 
labour" determined the kinds of development which would take 
place within these two zones of the modern world system: 
'Development' is the consequence of the place of 
an economy within the international division of 
2 ibid.,p.18. 
3 'b'd 1 1 • 
4 ibid., p.31. 
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labour; by this I mean the country's particular 
role in producing particular commodities for the 
international economy. 5 
Bedggood uses the term "development" to refer to the vastly 
different historical experiences of an imperial power and 
its colonial subject. Once incorporated into the modern 
world system, those countries which were "assigned a 
colonial role" became "underdeveloped" while the imperial 
powers became "developed 11 • 6 The most striking consequence of 
these different types of development is manifested in the 
poverty of the underdeveloped world and the wealth of the 
developed world. If we adopt more familiar terminology, 
underdeveloped countries belong to the poverty stricken 
third world while developed countries are those affluent 
members of first world. 
Bedggood explains these different experiences of 
development in terms of the rich nations exploitation of 
poor nations. In his own words, the colonies 
are poor because they were once 'rich' and their 
raw materials and labour have been plundered and 
exploited by the more advanced European powers 
since the sixteenth century. 7 
The reverse also applies: the imperial powers became rich as 
a result of their "plunder and exploitation" of the 
colonies. Bedggood's modern world system, like 
Wallerstein's, is an international division of labour in 
which the poverty of the underdeveloped world is 
5 'b 'd 1 1 • 
6 'b'd 1 1 . 
7 ibid. 
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inextricably tied to the wealth of the developed world. 
Bedggood then goes on to argue that this international 
division of labour was organized in a way which enabled the 
imperial centre to "plunder and exploit" the colonial 
periphery. Such exploitation was possible because the modern 
world system was controlled by "the capitalist class of the 
imperialist states". 8 consequently, the modern world system 
ensured that the colonial periphery "developed", albeit 
towards underdevelopment, in a way which benefited the 
productive and consumptive requirements of the imperial 
centre: 
... the countries of the 'periphery• ... have 
"developed" to suit the interests of international 
capital rather than [the interests] of the 
indigenous populations. 9 
The process of "development" experienced by colonies was, 
therefore, dependent upon the needs of international capital 
located in the imperial centre. This dependence was enforced 
through the "ownership and control of the economic resources 
of the poor nations" by the "capitalist class of the 
imperialist states". 10 
It is now obvious that the modern world systems 
described by Bedggood and Wallerstein share remarkable 
similarities. Both are essentially bi-polar models with the 
development of the imperial centre being inextricably linked 
to the underdevelopment of the colonial periphery. The 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid., p.18. 
10 ibid., p. 31. 
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causal mechanisms which link these two poles are defined by 
relationships of exploitation and domination. Indeed, it is 
helpful to picture these relationships as a set of 
coordinates which are defined by the limits established by 
the exploiter and the exploited, dependence and 
independence, development and underdevelopment. The 
similarities between Wallerstein and Bedggood do not end 
here. Both encounter problems when they interpolate an 
intermediate category in their bi-polar model of 
development. Those nations which fail to conform to the 
mutually exclusive criteria set up by the modern world 
system reside somewhat u~easily in the middle of the 
continuum marked out by the imperial core and the colonial 
periphery. Bedggood has replaced Wallerstein's semi-
periphery with his own residual category which he names the 
"semi-colony". 11 
New Zealand and other "lands of white settlement1112 are 
those awkward semi-colonial nations which exhibit 
characteristics of the imperial centre and the colonial 
periphery. New Zealand's early independence and relative 
affluence stand incongruously with the degree of her 
dependence upon British capital and markets. Clearly, New 
Zealand does not belong at either pole of the modern world 
system but "somewhere" in the middle: 
11 'b 'd l l • 
12 D. Bedggood. "New Zealand's Semi-Colonial 
Development: A Marxist View", Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Sociology, vols.13-14., 1977-78, p.285. 
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New Zealand's place in this scheme of things is 
somewhere in the middle, a nation which indirectly 
exploits and therefore benefits from favoured 
economic development yet at the same time is 
dependent on British capital • 13 . 
As a result of his adoption of this bi-polar model of 
development, Bedggood is unable to squeeze New Zealand into 
the middle of the relationships defined by development, 
dependence and exploitation. Quite simply, New Zealand does 
not reside "somewhere in the middle" of these mutually 
exclusive criteria which define the modern world system. As 
we shall see New Zealand was more dependent upon foreign 
capital than colonial India and periodically exhibited a 
standard of living which exceeded that of imperial Britain. 
One Marxist statistician concludes that during the 1880 1 s 
real wages in New Zealand exceeded those in Britain by a 
ratio of 35 to 30. 14 This would make "semi-colonial II New 
Zealand more affluent than an imperialist state. Contrary to 
Bedggood's claim, New Zealand lies at opposite ends and not 
the "somewhere in the middle" of the modern world system. 
Bedggood is unwittingly 'hoist' by the same 'petard' as 
Wallerstein. While Wallerstein invented an intermediary 
category to remove difficult cases like New Zealand from his 
bi-polar model of development, Bedggood actually proposed 
the existence of the modern world system as a way to 
understand the development of New Zealand! 
13 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class. Politics and Ideology, p.33. 
14 J. Kuczynski, A Short History of Labour Conditions 
Under Industrial Capitalism in Great Britain and the Empire 
1750-1944, London, 1972, p.181. 
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Despite Bedggood's inability to place New Zealand 
precisely within the modern world system he still maintains 
that New Zealand's intermediate form of development was 
largely determined by its semi-colonial role within the 
international division of labour: 
While a form of 'dependent• partial development 
took place in the white settler colonies, it was 
largely determined by the production of 
specialized commodities in the international 
di vision of labour. 15 
Just as New Zealand's experience of "favoured economic 
development1116 is contrasted with the underdevelopment of the 
colonies, the political independence of semi-colonial states 
stands in vivid contrast to the colonies still under foreign 
rule. Bedggood claims that despite New Zealand's formal 
political independence, the "semi-colony" had no more 
control of her economic resources than colonies like India 
which did not enjoy independence. Therefore, the political 
independence of "white settler dominions 1117 in no way implies 
a greater degree of national control over their economic 
resources: 
In the case of white settler dominions such as New 
Zealand, though self governing, the domination of 
'foreign' capital in the ownership and control of 
economic resources is no less real than in any 
other form of colony. [sic) 18 
Although the foreign domination of indigenous economic 
resources was a feature of both colonies and semi-colonies, 
15 'b 'd 1 1 ., p.18. 
16 'b 'd 1 1 ., p.33. 
17 'b'·d 1 1 ., p.18. 
18 Bad grammar in the original. ibid. 
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Bedggood wishes to distinguish between them on the basis of 
their respective access to foreign capital. If we examine 
the amount of capital Britain invested in her empire we find 
that the "white settler colonies" of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa usually absorbed more capital than 
India. During the decade of the 1880 1 s, these states 
received 29% of all British capital while India received 
15%. 19 British capital continued to flow in similar ratios 
until the 1930's. Although these figures show the collective 
preeminence of "white settler states" they also show India 
to be a very important outlet for British capital. This 
importance is underscored during the 1860's which saw 21% of 
British capital invested in India compared with 12% for the 
"white settler states". 20 
Bedggood claims that the superior access of semi-
colonies to British capital explains why they were able to 
occupy a different role from the colonies within the 
international division of labour: 
What distinguishes the dominions from colonies, 
however, is the greater extent to which the 
foreign investment of foreign capital -especially 
in the form of national debt- allowed them to 
develop as highly efficient primary producers in 
the international division of labour. 21 
While the ability of "white settler dominions 1122 to attract 
19 M. Barratt Brown, After Imperialism, Heinemann, 1963, 
p.110. 
~ ibid. 
21 D. Bedggood,· Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.18. 
22 ibid., p.18. 
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the lion's share of British capital may have aided their 
"favoured economic development 1123 Bedggood' s explanation is 
made in terms of a vague reference to New Zealand 
inadvertently abetting "the expansion of British capital":~ 
•.• settler colonies like New Zealand escaped the 
trap of underdevelopment, not because local states 
were able to resist the British state, but because 
they acted as agents of the imperial state by 
'developing' along lines which furthered the 
expansion of British capital.~ 
In other words, Bedggood argues that New Zealand developed 
as a "highly efficient primary producer 1126 because this best 
suited the interests of British capitalism. The remainder of 
this chapter will show how New Zealand's annexation, 
colonization and subsequent development did not serve the 
needs of British capitalism. Consequently, Bedggood is 
unable to explain the development of New Zealand by 
referring to the imperatives of the modern world system in 
general and British capitalism in particular. 
(2.2) The Semi-Colonial Development of New Zealand. 
The rigidly deterministic analysis of Bedggood portrays 
the development of New Zealand as a reflection of the 
overall development of capitalism on a world scale. Within 
this world system New Zealand and other "white settler 
23 ibid., p. 33. 
24 ibid., p. 32 • 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid., p.18 • 
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dominions" evolved as "semi-colonies". 27 This semi-colonial 
status was the key factor in determining the course of New 
Zealand's development. Bedggood writes that "New Zealand's 
development is determined in the last instance by its semi-
colonial role in the capitalist world system. 1128 
As we have already seen, New Zealand became a semi-
colonial state so that she could develop along lines which 
served the needs of British capitalism: 
••• it was British capitalism that assigned to the 
semi-colonial state a role which determined the 
form of development that took place in New 
Zealand. 29 
This semi-colonial role saw New Zealand "develop as a highly 
efficient primary producer in the international division of 
labour. 1130 The following discussion is a critical evaluation 
of two aspects which Bedggood claims describe New Zealand's 
semi-colonial role within this international division of 
labour. The first aspect describes how New Zealand was able 
to develop as a "highly efficient primary producer". The 
second gives some of the reasons why British capitalism 
required New Zealand to develop along semi-colonial lines. 31 
Bedggood argues that New Zealand enjoyed three 
advantages which allowed her to develop as a "highly 
21 ibid. 
~ ibid., p.44. 
~ ibid., p.32. 
~ ibid., p.18. 
31 We will examine the requirement of British Capitalism 
for New Zealand's land and raw materials in section (2.3) 
below. 
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efficient primary producer". 32 The first advantage stemmed 
from the "social form of production 1133 employed by New 
Zealand agriculture. Unlike the capitalist farmer employing 
wage labour, the New Zealand farmer employed the "petty 
commodity" form of production which used "family labour 1134 • 
Bedggood claims that the cost of labour is lower where a 
farmer employs family members. Where work was not performed 
by a family member, wage labourers were employed and "paid 
low wages or worked in return for their keep". 35 Therefore, 
the use of "family labour", occasionally supplemented with 
low paid wage labour, enabled this petty commodity form of 
production to keep labour costs very low. 36 
The second advantage enjoyed by New Zealand agriculture 
was derived from a phenomenon Bedggood terms "founders' 
rent 1137 • This term refers to the natural fertility of the 
land which freed the colonial farmer from the expense of 
"building up the fertility of the soil through artificial 
means". 38 Until this natural fertility had to replenished by 
fertilizer, colonial New Zealand was able to produce a 
larger agricultural surplus than other countries given the 
32 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.18. 
33 ibid . ' p . 3 5 . 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
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same inputs of capital and labour. "Founders' rent" enabled 
New Zealand agriculture to expend less capital and labour to 
produce primary products which were as valuable as those of 
its competitors. In Bedggood's words, "the more fertile the 
land the greater the value produced for a given amount of 
capital and labour-power. 1139 
As the natural fertility of the land was used up the 
advantages derived from "founders' rent" declined. The 
application of fertilizer required the capital and labour 
inputs of agriculture to rise which gradually eroded the 
cost advantage enjoyed by New Zealand farmers. In order to 
maintain this cost advantage the state intervened to 
subsidize the capital costs of agriculture. This provision 
of "state aid 1140 was the third advantage enjoyed by New 
Zealand agriculture. This subsidy took several forms, the 
first being the provision of "cheap credit" in order to 
defray the increasing costs being encountered with declining 
fertility. 41 The second measure involved the creation of 
"state agencies for the marketing of produce". 42 Probably the 
most significant subsidy was the third, the state's 
construction of ports and railways in order to "reduce 
transport and freight costs". 43 Overall the state provided an 
infrastructure which enabled New Zealand agriculture to 
39 ibid. 
4o ibid., p. 38 · 
41 ibid., p.39. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. , p, 3 9 • 
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remain competitive. 
There are major problems with Bedggood's explanation of 
the development of New Zealand as a "highly efficient 
primary producer 11 • 44 In claiming that New Zealand enjoyed the 
advantage of natural fertility, Bedggood is simply wrong. 
New Zealand has never possessed agricultural land of an 
unusually fertile nature either before or after the arrival 
of European settlers. Indeed, the soil resources of England 
and France are certainly-richer than those of New Zealand. 45 
There is a huge variety of soil types in New Zealand, much 
of it unsuitable for agriculture. In terms of agricultural 
usage much of the South Island is useless, with a large 
proportion of the total area being occupied by the Southern 
Alps and the rainforests of South Westland. The poor 
tropical and sub-tropical soils of North Auckland are also 
marginal from an agricultural point of view with large areas 
now being converted back to forestry. The pockets of rich 
soils New Zealand does possess, such as the Omihi soil of 
the Waipara district, are comparatively rare. 46 
As a result of the rather undistinguished fertility of 
its land, New Zealand agriculture is among some of the least 
efficient in terms of output per hectare. If we compare the 
agricultural output produced by one hectare of agricultural 
land in 1970, Belgium would produce an output which was 514% 
44 'b 'd l l . , p. 18. 
45 E. J.B. cutler, "Soil and History, Rich Soils - First 
World: Poor Soils - Third World", Historical News, No.51., 
1985, University of Canterbury. 
46 'b 'd l l ., p.15. 
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more than New Zealand's. 47 Any advantage enjoyed by New 
Zealand agriculture lay in the highly favourable ratio of 
land to labour. If we compare the amount of land available 
to each agricultural worker we find that a New Zealand farm 
labourer worked 950% more land than his Belgian 
counterpart. 48 This extremely favourable land/labour ratio 
allowed New Zealand to enjoy one of the most efficient 
agricultural sectors in terms of per capita output. Indeed, 
if we compare the per capita output of agricultural 
producers, New Zealand's output was 70% larger than 
Belgium's. 49 
It would appear that the reasons for the development of 
New Zealand and other "white settler dominions" as "highly 
efficient primary producers" are to be found in their 
favourable ratio of land to labour. New Zealand possessed 
128 hectares of agricultural land per farm worker. Other 
"white settler colonies" have similar ratios of land to 
labour. For example, the figures range from Australia's 
staggering 1603 hectares per farm worker to Canada's 180 and 
47 Belgium's output of wheat units per hectare of 
agricultural land was 9.52 compared with New Zealand's 1.55. 
All figures are derived from 1970 statistics. J.W. Kendrick 
and B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity 
Measurement and Analysis, University of Chicago Press, 1980, 
p.530. 
48 New Zealand possessed 128 hectares of agricultural 
land per farm worker as opposed to Belgium's 12.2. J.W. 
Kendrick and B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity 
Measurement and Analysis, pp.580-81. 
49 Belgium's per capita output was 116.2 wheat units 
compared with New Zealand's world-beating 198.2. J.W. 
Kendrick and B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity 
Measurement and Analysis, p.530. 
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Argentina's 143. 50 We will examine Bedggood's claim that the 
use of the petty commodity mode of production enabled New 
Zealand to be markedly more efficient than its British 
counterpart. 
In a confirmation of his thesis regarding the cost 
advantages of the petty commodity form of production 
Bedggood compares the efficiency of the agricultural sectors 
of New Zealand and Britain. 51 The purpose of this comparison 
is to show how the more widespread use of family labour 
enabled New Zealand to keep labour costs lower than in the 
more fully capitalist agricultural sector of Britain. Such a 
comparison is very difficult and Bedggood avoids such 
problems by using a "hypothetical example1152 which simply 
assumes the lower cost of labour in New Zealand. Even if 
this assumption was justified, Bedggood is in no way 
entitled to conclude that the use of different modes of 
labour control account for the lower cost of agricultural 
labour in New Zealand. As we have already noted, a vastly 
more favourable ratio of land to labour is more likely to be 
the cause of any "advantages" enjoyed by New Zealand 
agriculture. 53 
50 J.W. Kendrick and B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in 
Productivity Measurement and Analysis, pp.580-81. 
51 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.36. 
52 ibid. , p . 3 6 . 
53 In 1970 a New Zealand farm labourer worked 272% more 
land than his British counterpart. See: J.W. Kendrick and 
B.N Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity Measurement 
and Analysis, pp.580-81. 
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The widespread use of "family labour" was not simply an 
"advantage" enjoyed by New Zealand agriculture as Bedggood 
implies. Indeed, the use of "family labour" was and still is 
equally prevalent in French agriculture. Consequently, the 
cost advantages associated with the use of family labour in 
New Zealand should also be shared by France. In an effort to 
locate the significance of the use of family labour we will 
compare the remuneration and productivity of French and 
British agricultural labour. We will choose 1890 as the date 
for this comparison as refrigeration by then allowed New 
Zealand, with her allegedly advantageous "social form of 
production", 54 to compete with other meat and dairy producers 
on the British market. 55 At this time, the remuneration 
received by British agricultural labourers was practically 
identical to their French counterparts. 56 The simple 
comparison of remuneration levels, however, does not tell 
the whole story. The actual cost of labour must take into 
account both wage and productivity levels. With respect to 
productivity, we find that the per capita output of British 
agricultural labour was 111% higher than that of the 
54 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: Critique 
of Class. Politics and Ideology, p.35. 
55 T. Brooking, "Economic Transformation", Oxford 
History of New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 1987, 
p.232. 
56 h t ' 't ' d ' Te wage ra e was 2.5 in Bri ain an 2.43 in France. 
All figures are compiled from the 1890 statistics. See: J.W. 
Kendrick and B.N. vaccara, New Developments in Productivity 
Measurement and Analysis, pp.570-73. 
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French. 57 Consequently, the higher wages received by British 
agricultural labour were more than offset by its superior 
productivity. Contrary to Bedggood's claim, the prevalence 
of petty commodity production in France and wage labour in 
Britain resulted in ,a lower unit labour cost in a more fully 
capitalist agricultural sector. 
This is the crux of Bedggood's error. The use of family 
labour rather than wage labour cannot by itself explain a 
disparity in the costs of agricultural labour. As we have 
already seen, what we need to look at is the ratio of land 
to labour. Here we find that a French agricultural labourer 
worked 52% less land than his British counterpart. 58 In fact, 
this unfavourable ratio of land to labour can be explained 
by the prevalence of family farms. 59 In France, therefore, 
the employment of a petty commodity mode of production acted 
to keep the real cost of labour up. The main point is clear, 
if Bedggood wishes to identify any "advantages" enjoyed by 
New Zealand agriculture he need not go any further than the 
extremely favourable land to labour ratio. Explanations such 
as "founders' rent" and the "petty commodity mode of 
production" are, on the whole, inadequate. 
57 The per capita output in wheat units was 17.57 in 
Britain and 8.33 in France. J.W. Kendrick and B.N. Vaccara, 
New Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis, 
pp.570-73. 
58 The hectares of agricultural land per worker were 
15.65 in Britain and 7.52 in France. J.W. Kendrick and B.N. 
Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity Measurement and 
Analysis, pp.570-73. 
~ R. Brenner, ''The Origins of capitalist Development: A 
Critique of Neo-Srnithian Marxism", New Left Review, 1977, 
pp.73-77. 
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Having noted the deficiency of Bedggood's account of 
the development of New Zealand as a "highly efficient 
primary producer" we will examine some of the reasons he 
gives for the way in which British capitalism benefitted 
from this semi-colonial development. In order to understand 
how British capitalism benefits from New Zealand's 
assumption of a semi-colonial role, we must first understand 
the "chain of exploitative relations 1160 which forms the basis 
of capitalism on a world scale. Bedggood's concept of 
exploitation is an uneasy amalgam of Wallerstein's notion of 
international exploitation and Marx's notion of inter-class 
exploitation. Accordingly, Bedggood argues that any surplus 
that is transferred from colonial India to imperial Britain 
entails the exploitation of both the peasantry in India and 
wage labourers in Britain. In other words, Bedggood's notion 
of exploitation between nations is expressed in terms of 
inter-class exploitation: 
Once we understand how the world system works to 
syphon surplus value from periphery to centre to 
facilitate exploitation at the centre, we can 
trace the exploitative relations of classes within 
as well as across nations. 61 
Gathering the argument together, Bedggood's "chain of 
exploitative relations" looks like this. British industrial 
capitalism "plunders and exploits" the "Indian peasant" in 
order to "accumulate primitive capita1 11 • 62 Having accumulated 
60 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.42. 
61 , b, d l l ., p.41. 
62 ibid. 
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this capital, British capitalism was able to expand and 
develop production which further enhanced its ability to 
exploit British workers and hence to generate a profit. This 
profit was then exported to the "new lands of settlement 1163 , 
such as New Zealand, along with the British workers who were 
surplus to requirement.~ The semi-colonial development that 
resulted from this export of capital and labour enabled 
British capitalism to "benefit from the cheap food supplies 
and the interest on the national debt 1165 which it obtained 
from New Zealand. By keeping the costs of production to a 
minimum, these "cheap food supplies" enabled British 
capitalism to maximize profitability. This profitability was 
also enhanced by the expansion and development of British 
capitalism which was made possible by the collection of 
interest due on New Zealand's "national debt". 
In this way, British capitalism is said to exploit the 
direct producers in all parts of the modern world system, be 
they Indian peasants in the colonies, British wage labourers 
in the imperial centre, or New Zealand petty commodity 
producers in the semi-colonies. The circle created by 
Bedggood' s global "chain of exploitative relations 1166 is 
allegedly closed, allowing British capitalism to exploit all 
the world's workforce. 
~ 'b'd l l , 
64 For a more detailed discussion of this point see 
section (2.3) below. 
65 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.42. 
M 'b'd l l , 
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This exploitation of the world's workforce enables 
British capitalism to maximize its own profitability. What 
Bedggood does not explain is the way in which this "chain of 
exploitative relations" works to "syphon surplus value1167 
from the non-capitalist to the capitalist sectors of the 
modern world system. Following the Marxist line, Wallerstein 
identifies "surplus value" as the sole source of the 
capitalists' profit.~ By paying the working class less for 
their labour power than the value its labour power creates, 
capitalists are able to generate a profit. This profit is in 
the form of the "surplus value" which capitalists have 
appropriated from the wage labourers. It is the appearance 
of profit in the form of "surplus value" which forms the 
basis of the charge of exploitation which Marxists level at 
capitalism. According to the Marxist concept of exploitation 
adopted by Bedggood, British capitalism can only "syphon 
surplus value 1169 from wage labourers. Consequently, Bedggood 
is unable to show how British capitalism can transfer 
surplus value from colonial India or semi-colonial New 
Zealand as these non-capitalist forms of production do not 
create "surplus value". Therefore, Bedggood is unable to 
67 'b 'd l l • 
~ '' ... according to the law of value, under the 
capitalist mode of production wage labour produces the value 
of its own labour power plus the surplus value which becomes 
the source of all profits going to the capitalist and rent 
going to the landlord." See D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in 
New Zealand: A Critique of Class, Politics and Ideology, 
p.60. 
69 'b'd l l ., p.41. 
-----
explain his world wide system of "exploitative relations 1170 . 
in terms of the Marxist notion of inter-class exploitation. 
62 
In order to resolve this anomaly, Bedggood retains the 
Marxian definition of capitalism as a mode of production 
while abandoning the idea that exploitation originates in 
production. 71 Bedggood, like Wallerstein, concludes that the 
key to exploitation is located in the exchange of 
commodities which occurs within the capitalist world 
economy. As a result, Bedggood claims that it is not the way 
in which a commodity is produced but the price at which it 
is sold which lies at the heart of exploitation on a world 
scale. He writes, "what is important in the 'growing of raw 
material for the mother country' is its price and not how it 
is produced. 1172 Therefore, the price at which a commodity 
exchanges, rather than the methods used to produce it, is 
the fundamental determinant of Bedggood's theory of 
international exploitation. With "surplus value" expressed 
in terms of price Bedggood sets out to show how surplus 
value is transferred within the modern world system. 
Bedggood's theory of international exploitation 
explains that surplus value is transferred between countries 
via an "unequal exchange of value". 73 Bedggood's model of 
70 'b'd l l . 
71 For a more complete discussion of the implications of 
capitalism defined as a mode of exchange see section (1.1) 
above. 
72 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.34. 
73 'b'd l l ., p.38. 
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unequal exchange, like Wallerstein's, argues that prices 
diverge from values in a way which enables one trading 
partner to receive more value in exchange for less. One 
branch of this world-wide system of unequal exchange 
involved New Zealand's export of primary products to 
Britain. With regard to New Zealand's position within this 
"chain of exploitative relations" it is important to note 
that the nature of New Zealand's agricultural production 
allows the "semi-colony" to function as both the exploiter 
and the exploited. The cost competitiveness of New Zealand 
agriculture enables the New Zealand farmer to reap "excess 
profits 1174 while the supply of "cheap foodstuffs" and wool 
enhances the profitability of enterprises in Britain. 
Although surplus flows both ways, Bedggood specifically 
cities the case where an "unequal exchange" of value 
resulted in the New Zealand agricultural producer being able 
to reap "excess profits" by receiving more value in exchange 
for less. 
Bedggood argues that the ability of Britain's 
agricultural sector to compete with New Zealand was hindered 
by her "less productive land 11 75 and the use of wage labour. 
Consequently, New Zealand was able to land wool, dairy and 
frozen meat in Britain at a cost which was lower than that 
required to produce equivalent commodities in Britain. As 
long as demand exceeded supply~ the New Zealand producer was 
~ ibid., P• 36 · 
~ ibid. 
~ ibid. 
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able to sell identical agricultural commodities at the same 
price as his British counterpart. As his "costs of 
production are the most competitive" the New Zealand farmer 
was able to enjoy "excess profits".n In other words, New 
Zealand agriculture received a price for the commodities it 
exported to Britain which reflected costs of production 
which were in excess of the actual costs of production. In 
effect, New Zealand benefitted from this unequal exchange of 
value by receiving more value in exchange for less. In the 
same way as the capitalist appropriated value which he did 
not create, New Zealand's agricultural producers receive 
value which they did not create. 
It is noteworthy that Bedggood's explanation of 
"unequal exchange" does not point to any empirical evidence 
which shows that the costs of producing agricultural 
commodities were lower in New Zealand than Britain. His 
explanation is simply based on two assumptions which are 
presented in such a way that the second actually invalidates 
the first. The first assumption is couched in the form of a 
"hypothetical example1178 drawn from the problematic labour 
theory of value. 79 This argues that values depart from prices 
in a way which enables New Zealand to receive more value in 
n ibid. 
ro ibid. 
N For an introductory discussion of the Use of the 
labour theory of value as an explanation for "unequal 
exchange" see section (1.3) above. The most coherent version 
of the labour theory of value is used by Rob Steven to 
justify his claim that New Zealand benefitted from "unequal 
exchange". My critique of this is found in section (3.3) 
below. 
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exchange for less. The second assumption claims that the 
natural advantages furnished by "founders' rent", a "petty 
commodity mode of production" and "state subsidies" enabled 
New Zealand agriculture to be more cost competitive than 
British agriculture. By explaining "unequal exchange" in 
terms of costs and prices, this second assumption undermines 
the first by rendering the concept of value redundant. 
Consequently, this critique of Bedggood's theory of "unequal 
exchange" will focus on his explanation for the low cost of 
agricultural production in New Zealand. 
The most obvious criticism of this explanation is posed 
by the large influx of British capital into New Zealand. The 
greater profitability of New Zealand agriculture would 
eventually be whittled down as capital in search of "excess 
profits" closed marginal farms in Britain and opened up ever 
more marginal farms in the colony. Bedggood attempts to 
quash this criticism by claiming that this flow of capital 
required to equalize the rate of profit in New Zealand was 
blocked. New Zealand agriculture, therefore, continued to 
reap "excess profits" because it was able to "monopolize 
agricultural production" in order to circumvent this 
tendency of the rate of profit to equalize. 80 The substance 
of Bedggood's argument that New Zealand presented such 
monopolistic restrictions is located in the provision of 
state subsidies: 
80 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Ideology and Politics, p.36. 
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... while state intervention breaks the monopoly 
control of the comprador class over the peasant 
family mode in subsidising the costs of 
agricultural production, this only modifies the 
basic pattern of unequal exchange, it does not 
reverse it. 81 
Once again, Bedggood is simply wrong. State subsidies, 
such as those provided by the 1894 Advances to Settlers Act, 
actually sought to break up rather than reinforce any 
monopoly which existed in New Zealand agriculture. While 
cheap credits benefitted well established farmers, these 
state subsidies also allowed British immigrants to establish 
farms in New Zealand. 82 Contrary to Bedggood's claim, state 
subsidies made New Zealand agriculture less rather than more 
prone to monopolistic restrictions which form the basis of 
his theory of unequal exchange. 
This critique shows that Bedggood is wrong about 
several key points concerning New Zealand's semi-colonial 
development. Firstly, New Zealand did not develop as a 
"highly efficient primary producer" as a result of alleged 
advantages derived from "founders' rent" and the "petty 
commodity mode of production". Secondly, my rejection of 
Bedggood's theory of "unequal exchange" undermines the 
validity of the theoretical edifice of his modern world 
system. Therefore, it is doubtful whether New Zealand 
developed as a semi-colonial state as a result of her 
81 D. Bedggood and J. Macrae, "The Development of 
Capitalism in New Zealand: Towards a Marxian Analysis", Red 
Papers, Marxist Publishing Group, 177, p.124. 
82 Len Richardson, "Parties and Political Change", 
Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford University Press, 
1987, p.204 . . 
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function within Bedggood's "chain of exploitative 
relations". The final section will examine Bedggood's 
explanation of specific episodes in New Zealand history. 
Again we will find, that explanations for the annexation and 
subsequent colonization of New Zealand cannot be made with 
sole reference to the purported needs of British capitalism. 
(2.3) British capitalism and the Annexation of New Zealand. 
Non-Marxist accounts of Britain's annexation of New 
Zealand in 1840 begin by examining the "motives'' of the 
different groups involved. They assess the role played by 
groups such as the missionaries, the settlers and the 
Colonial Office in order to understand the annexation of New 
Zealand. In a complete departure from this orthodoxy, 
Bedggood maintains that annexation can only be understood 
with reference to the needs of British capitalism: 
The orthodox concern to explain the act of 
annexation by means of a minute examination of the 
motives of those concerned, whether missionaries, 
the Colonial Office or white settlers, begs the 
question of economic determinism in the last 
instance.~ 
The work of non-Marxist historians all concur that 
fundamental differences existed between these various groups 
prior to annexation. The missionaries wished to protect the 
Maori from the ravages of European colonization. The 
secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Dandeson Coates, 
83 D. Bedggood, "New Zealand's Semi-Colonial 
Development: A Marxist View", p.286. 
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was opposed to colonization and wanted New Zealand to remain 
a Maori territory under the protection of the British state. 
In opposition to these goals stood Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 
the principal advocate of the would-be colonists. Wakefield 
wished to colonize New Zealand without cost to the British 
state by selling land at a "sufficient price". The Colonial 
Office stood uneasily between the conflicting aspirations of 
the missionaries and the colonists. Although reluctant to 
become embroiled, the Colonial Office recognized the need to 
address the problems of lawlessness in New Zealand.M 
In opposition to this historiography, Bedggood 
maintains that any explanation which focuses on the 
differences which existed between the various antagonists 
fails to understand the true nature of the annexation of New 
Zealand. Bedggood argues that the antagonisms which divided 
the missionaries, colonists and the Colonial Office only 
served to disguise the more fundamental goals they all 
shared. These common goals were all based on the "class 
interests" which ultimately served the ends of the British 
"imperialist state": 
Once we have established that the dominant class 
interests of white settlers were not in 
contradiction to the imperialist ,state, the highly 
over-rated role of the missionaries and 
humanitarians becomes clear. 85 
This alleged community of "interests" leads Bedggood to 
conclude that all "white settlers" were simply "agents of 
84 K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, Penguin books, 
1980, pp.63-5. 
85 D. Bedggood, "New Zealand's Semi-Colonial 
Development: A Marxist View", p.287. 
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the capitalist mode of production" acting "in the interests 
of the industrial bourgeoisie11 • 86 My objection to Bedggood's 
argument is founded upon his reluctance to actually show how 
these "bourgeois agents 1187 were able to bring about the 
annexation of New Zealand. Quite simply, the desire of 
bourgeois agents for annexation does not prove that 
annexation occurred as a result of these forces. This 
erroneous type of causal explanation is also apparent in 
Bedggood's account of the colonization of New Zealand. His 
explanation does little more than claim that the annexation 
and subsequent colonization of New Zealand suited the 
purposes of British capitalism searching for land, labour 
and raw materials: 
Tthe purpose of the colonization of New Zealand 
could hardly be more clear: a part of the 
universal expansion of the capitalist mode of 
production in an attempt to find new sources of 
land, raw materials and labour power. 88 
By claiming that the annexation of New Zealand accommodated 
the alleged needs of British capitalism, Bedggood is not 
justified to conclude that New Zealand was annexed in order 
to fulfil those needs. Furthermore, I will show how New 
Zealand's minimal capacity to act as a source of land and 
raw materials effectively invalidates,Bedggood's explanation 
for the annexation and subsequent colonization of New 
Zealand. 
86 ibid., pp.286-7. 
~ 'b'd l 1 • 
88 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.21. 
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Although the British colonies of Australia and New 
Zealand acted as raw material producers for the imperial 
centre, there is nothing to suggest that New Zealand was 
annexed in order to fulfil this role. Even if we compare New 
Zealand's raw material production with that of Australia, 
let alone the British empire, the minimal role played by New 
Zealand's raw materials becomes apparent. A leading non-
Marxist historian of New Zealand's annexation concluded that 
while New Zealand was a second rank trading partner with the 
British colonies in Australia, "to Britain itself, the 
economic importance of New Zealand was very small indeed. 1189 
In an effort to present Bedggood's argument in the best 
possible light, I have ignored the years prior to 1861 as a 
confirmation of the minimal role played by New Zealand as a 
source of raw materials. Prior to the discovery of gold in 
1861 New Zealand's role as a supplier of raw materials was 
negligible in view of the fact that the value of her exports 
in 1860 accounted for 3.5% of the Australian total. 90 As a 
result of the discovery of gold the value of New Zealand's 
exports increased by a massive 57% between 1860 and 1861. 91 
89 P. Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in 
New Zealand 1830-1847, Auckland University Press, 1977, 
p.168. 
90 New Zealand's export receipts totalled £589,000 in 
1860. M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, Collins, 1970, p.81. 
Australia's export receipts totalled £17,400,000 in 1861. A. 
Lougheed, "International Transaction and foreign Commerce", 
Wray Vamplew, Australians: Historical statistics, 1987, 
p.188. 
91 New Zealand's export receipts jumped from £589,000 in 
1860 to £1,372,000 in 1861. See: M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An 
Economic History of New Zealand to 1939, p.81. 
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With such dramatic improvements, New Zealand's export 
receipts accounted for 8% of the Australian total. By 1861, 
two commodities virtually accounted for New Zealand's total 
export revenue with gold making up 55% and wool 38% of the 
colony's export receipts. 92 Australia still dominated the 
production of these commodities, however, with New Zealand 
wool and gold output being equivalent to 11% and 9% of total 
Australian production. 93 In short, New Zealand produced 
little that Britain could not obtain somewhere else and in 
much greater quantities. If we place the value of New 
Zealand's exports in the context of the value of British 
imports the picture becomes even clearer with New Zealand 
accounting for a minute 0.5% of the total in 1861. 94 It would 
appear that the monetary value of the New Zealand economy, 
both before and after the discovery of gold, provide little 
incentive for British capitalism to bring about the 
annexation of New Zealand. 
Bedggood argues that British capitalism's need for land 
stemmed from two different yet complementary requirements. 
Britain's need to rid herself of her "vast surplus 
92 M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, p.81. 
93 New Zealand exported £524,000 of wool and £753,000 of 
gold in 1861. See: M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History 
of New Zealand to 1939, p.81. Australia exported £4,7000,000 
of wool and £8,500,000 of gold in 1861. See: A. Lougheed, 
"International Transactions and Foreign Commerce", p.188. 
94 The value of British imports from all sources stood 
at £270,000,000 in 1861. C.J. Fuchs, The Trade Policy of 
Great Britain and Her Colonies Since 1860, London, 1905, 
p.398. 
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population1195 fitted in neatly with the requirement of 
recently established colonies for more labour. By annexing 
New Zealand and introducing capitalism there, a demand for 
labour would be created which would conveniently provide 
Britain with an outlet for her "surplus population". The 
trick, as Marx saw it, was to kill these two birds with one 
stone. Bedggood agrees and views the assisted immigration 
schemes as being: 
... deliberately promoted by capitalists concerned 
about the growing threat of political rebellion in 
Britain and eager for wage labour to exploit in 
the colonies. 96 
For many centuries the existence of a large number of 
paupers had alarmed the ruling classes of Europe. The 1830 1 s 
were to prove no exception with some members of the British 
elite viewing the existence of widespread poverty with some 
trepidation. 97 The seemingly inescapable poverty of many 
Britons was exacerbated by the huge population growth of the 
period. Indeed, the population of England and Wales doubled 
between 1750 and 1830. 98 These twin pressures of population 
and poverty led huge numbers to leave the British Isles in 
search of a better life. This exodus was greeted with relief 
by those who saw this supposedly excess population as a 
threat to the political stability of Britain. The simple 
95 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.20. 
% 'b'd 1 l l ., p.2 . 
97 E.H. Hunt, British Labour History, London, 1981, 
p.150. 
98 J.S. Marais, The Colonization of New Zealand, Oxford 
university Press, 1927, p.l. 
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existence of mass emigration, however, is not compelling 
evidence that New Zealand was annexed in order to provide 
land which enabled British capitalism to simultaneously rid 
itself of surplus population and supply labour for the 
colony. Furthermore, Bedggood's argument that New Zealand 
was annexed in 1840 as a means of financing the requirements 
of British capitalism at home and in the colonies also 
founders on the facts. If we look at British emigration 
during this period we will be struck by the inability of New 
Zealand to act as a dumping ground for Britain's "vast 
surplus population". 
According to Bedggood's figures, between 1815 and 1859: 
"over five million people left Britain for other parts of 
the world". 99 The deliberately vague nature of Bedggood' s 
empirical evidence (he only compares British emigration with 
the number of those bound for Australia and New Zealand) 
seems to point to the inadequacy of his argument. A decade 
after annexation New Zealand was home to a paltry 26,707 100 
British settlers or 12% of the Australasian total. 101 When 
viewed in the context of total emigration from Britain, New 
Zealand was the preferred destination by 1851 for less than 
99 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A Critique 
of Class, Politics and Ideology, p.21. 
100 • b, d l l • 
101 Between 1825 and 1851, 222,955 British migrants had 
arrived in the Australian and New Zealand colonies. C.M.H. 
Clark, Select Documents in Australian History, p.214. 
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1 9.c I 102 0. Even if Britain was involved in a deliberate policy 
to rid itself of surplus population, the reasons for 
annexing New Zealand in 1840 to further this aim were 
somewhat abstruse. Quite simply, compared with total British 
emigration the usefulness of New Zealand as a dumping ground 
for Britain's allegedly surplus population was negligible. 
Although Wakefield's assisted immigration schemes 
brought settlers to New Zealand, the gold rushes of the 
1860 1 s and 70's showed that the real attraction of New 
Zealand to immigrants was the prospect of instant wealth. In 
other words, large scale immigration only came about when 
New Zealand acted as a sufficient magnet and not as the 
result of Britain's need to rid herself of "surplus 
population". In 1851 otago had 1,776 inhabitants, or just 
under 7% of New Zealand's total European population. That 
figure had exploded to 27,168 by 1861 which boosted Otago's 
share of the total to 27.7%. 1~ While Otago's share remained 
static its population still stood at a respectable 60,722 by 
1871. 1~ The inevitable conclusion is that massive 
immigration was driven by the gold rushes in Otago and 
Westland and not by the export of a "vast surplus 
population". 
As a further test of Bedggood's argument that New 
102 From 1825 to 1851 total emigration from the U. K. 
stood at 2,901,999. See: C.M.H. Clark, Select Documents in 
Australian History, p.221. 
103 J. Graham, "Settler society", Oxford History of New 
Zealand, Oxford university Press, 1987, p.117. 
104 , b, d l l , 
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Zealand served as a dumping ground for Britain's surplus 
population we will examine the relationship between the 
urgency of population pressure and the levels of British 
migration to New Zealand. As Bedggood strespes the role of 
'push' factors such as poverty and unemployment, we would 
expect to find that patterns of immigration to New Zealand 
would reflect fluctuations in the living standard of 
Britain's working class. In other words, a falling standard 
of living should be reflected in larger numbers emigrating 
to New Zealand and vice versa. 
The decade after annexation saw relatively few Britons 
emigrate to New Zealand. By the time the companies and 
associations which practised assisted immigration went out 
of existence in 1854 they had managed to bring only 15,612 
immigrants to New Zealand. 105 This period, however, was one 
of exceptional hardship in Britain with some estimates 
putting one third of all working people out of work. 106 The 
poverty and social unrest of the "hungry forties" provided a 
dramatic contrast to the relative prosperity and calm of the 
1870 1 s. Although marked by severe fluctuations, unemployment 
averaged just 3.8% over the period 1870 to 1879. 1~ A further 
indication of better times is shown by the percentage of the 
population receiving indoor and outdoor relief under the 
1
~ K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, Penguin 
books, 1980, p.99. 
1M J.F.C. Harrison, The Early Victorians 1832-51, 
Panther books, 1973, p.73. 
1
~ G. Best, Mid-Victorian Britain 1851-75, Panther 
books, 1973, p.148. 
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meagre provisions of the Poor Laws. This figure fell from a 
high of 19% in 1849 to a low of 9% in 1879. 108 Contrary to 
Bedggood's expectations, British prosperity during the 
1870 1 s was matched by exceptionally high levels of British 
immigration to New Zealand. During this dec~de assisted 
immigration schemes operated by the New Zealand government 
brought a further 115, 000 settlers to the colony. 109 In a 
striking reversal of Bedggood's argument, large numbers of 
British migrants arrived in New Zealand during periods of 
relative prosperity in Britain. Similarly, the 'push' 
factors of poverty and unemployment did not force large 
numbers of Britons to emigrate to New Zealand. As we have 
already seen, 'pull' factors such as the goldrushes had a 
far more significant impact on immigration to New Zealand. 
Quit~ simply, an explanation of annexation based on New 
Zealand's role as a dumping ground for surplus population 
fails to match the patterns of immigration. 
Bedggood's argument fails on both counts. New Zealand 
could not have possibly been annexed in order to act as a 
dumping ground for surplus population as it absorbed such an 
insignificant amount of ~otal British emigration. 
Furthermore, the huge influx of British emigrants into New 
Zealand during the 1860 1 s cannot be counted as "surplus 
population" from the slums of industrial Britain but as men 
lured by the promise of gold, many of them coming from the 
108 , b, d 1 1 ., p.167. 
109 W.H. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, London, 1960, 
p.120. 
77 
Australian goldfields. During the first three years of the 
goldrush the number of Australian immigrants arriving in New 
Zealand substantially outnumbered those coming from Britain. 
Indeed, between 1861 and 1863, 74,919 immigrants arrived 
from Australia compared with 27,072 from Britain. 110 
Bedggood has noted that New Zealand became part of the 
British empire in 1840. He has then incorrectly concluded 
that this was done in order to fulfil the alleged economic 
needs of the colonizing power. Bedggood's reading of history 
in reverse has led him to make a fundamental error regarding 
the connection between the needs of British capitalism and 
the annexation of New Zealand. The point is that Britain did 
not want, let alone require another settler colony, but that 
given the course of events she decided to make the most of a 
bad situation and annex the whole of New Zealand in 1840. 
The annexation and subsequent sale of Maori land in order to 
sponsor immigration is not conclusive proof that New Zealand 
was annexed in accordance with the needs of British 
capitalism. Assisted immigration was instituted in order 
that Britain could discharge her reluctant participation in 
the colonization business as cheaply as possible. This is a 
more plausible explanation when we consider the financial 
fiasco of the South Australian colonies a decade earlier. 111 
Reluctant to repeat earlier failures: 
110 These figures are compiled from the immigration 
statistics in M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History of 
New Zealand to 1939, p.98. 
111 P. Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in 
new Zealand 1830-1947, p.150. 
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The fact that Hobson•s instructions included 
specific directions on the creation of a land fund 
for financing organized colonization under 
government auspices suggests that the Colonial 
Office recognized that Britain mi~ht as well make 
the best of a reluctant bargain. 11 
Bedggood's assumption that the colonies played a 
crucial role in the continued growth and development of 
British capitalism is unfounded. We have already seen how 
the development of capitalism was based largely on 
indigenous resources, capital and markets. 113 Furthermore, 
Bedggood fails to show how annexation acts as a vindication 
of his thesis that the development of New Zealand was 
"determined in the last instance11114 by the needs of British 
capitalism. This explanation proposes that a correlation 
existed between the needs of British capitalism for land and 
raw materials and the ability of New Zealand to provide 
them. In the absence of convincing causal mechanisms linking 
these needs with annexation it appears that Bedggood's 
analysis relies upon correlations masquerading as causes. 
Even if this were not the case, I have shown how New Zealand 
was incapable of fulfilling all but a tiny proportion of the 
alleged needs of British capitalism. 
Overall, Bedggood's explanation for the development of 
New Zealand is an excellent example of how the world systems 
approach of Wallerstein cannot credibly explain New Zealand 
history. The next chapter looks at Rob Steven's greatly 
112 'b'd l l ., p.170. 
113 See section (1.2) above. 
114 D. Bedggood, Rich and Poor in New Zealand: A 
Critique of Class. Politics and Ideology, p.44. 
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improved attempt to account for New Zealand's development by 
referring to the operation of capitalism on a global scale. 
Chapter Three: STEVEN AND SETTLER CAPITALISM IN NEW 
ZEALAND. 
(3.1) The case of Settler Capitalism. 
80 
Rob Steven attempts to explain the development of New 
Zealand by referring to the imperatives of "world 
imperialism". 1 Consequently, as countries like New Zealand 
were sucked into the ever expanding orbit of global 
capitalism their development was determined by the needs of 
imperialism. Just as Bedggood hopes to explain New Zealand 
history by referring to the imperatives of the modern world 
system Steven's overriding ambition is to develop a 
"comprehensive theory of imperialism and an analysis of New 
Zealand's role in world imperialism. 112 Both Bedggood and 
Steven assume that the fundamental forces which shape New 
Zealand's development lie in the imperatives of imperialist 
expansion which saw New Zealand swallowed up by the British 
empire. Rather than examine New Zealand history from the 
inside as it were, both Bedggood and Steven choose to view 
it in terms of the larger forces which surround it. A 
research agenda of this kind must pose two questions. The 
first wishes to discover the imperatives of imperialism 
while the second involves an analysis of the role New 
1 R. Steven, "Towards a Marxian Theory of Terms of Trade 
in New Zealand", Red Papers, Marxist Publishing Group, 1978-
79., p.46. 
2 R. Steven, "Towards a Marxian Theory of Terms of 
Trade", p.46. 
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Zealand plays within this imperialist system. Once answers 
to these questions have been found this type of research 
agenda claims that the true nature of New Zealand history 
will reveal itself. The substantial differences which 
distinguish Steven from Bedggood are to be found in the 
differing answers both find to these two questions. Neither 
scholar questions their implicit assumption: that the 
annexation, colonization and subsequent development of New 
Zealand is explained by New Zealand's role in "world 
imperialism". 
In a rare convergence, Marxists and neo-Marxists agree 
that newly capitalist nations will act as a source of raw 
materials, among other things, for capitalist firms located 
in the imperial centre. This agreement is short-lived as 
both disagree about the impact this role will have on the 
development of newly capitalist nations. Marxists claim that 
the development which imperialism brings will eventually 
enable colonial subjects to attain the levels of development 
enjoyed by their imperial masters. Nee-Marxists in the mould 
of Wallerstein and Bedggood argue that imperialism brings 
permanent non-development and semi-colonial development to 
newly capitalist nations. While Marxists portray imperialism 
as essentially progressive, even though it exploits, 
Wallerstein and Bedggood argue that imperialism exploits 
absolutely. 
Although a neo-Marxist, Steven is dissatisfied with the 
current state of the debate regarding the impact of 
imperialism on the development of newly capitalist nations. 
Steven points out that the development of New Zealand 
appears to elude the normal workings of these theories of 
imperialism: 
A paradox immediately springs to mind ... how 
could workers in newly and therefore backwardly 
capitalist New Zealand receive such relatively 
high wages and conditions that the colony could be 
described as "glorious country for a labouring 
man". 3 
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Wallerstein's response to the "paradox" of New Zealand was 
to superimpose the semi-periphery on his bi-polar model of 
development in order to remove such difficult cases. 
Bedggood misses the point entirely and accounts for the 
development of New Zealand in terms of a nee-Marxist theory 
of imperialism. Steven, on the other hand, wishes to explain 
the "paradox" of New Zealand by revising the nee-Marxist 
theory of imperialism. Essentially, Steven postulates the 
existence of "settler capitalism114 in order to show that 
Marxist theories of imperialism are not rebutted by the 
seemingly "paradoxical" nature of New Zealand's development. 
He argues that New Zealand belonged to a group of "settler 
capitalist" states whose development differed from that of 
other newly capitalist states. 
Steven's theory of "world imperialism" claims that the 
different types of development experienced by colonies like 
India and New Zealand are explained by the different 
function each performs within the British empire. This 
analysis of "world imperialism" begins by describing how the 
3 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
Race, Gender, Class, vol.1., No.1., 1985, p.44. 
4 'b'd l l • 
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most common imperatives which drove imperialism were those 
based on the needs of capitalist firms located in the 
imperial centre for cheap raw materials and labour. Steven 
agrees that the needs of British capitalism for cheap raw 
materials and labour form the principle explanation for the 
expansion of the British empire into countries like India or 
Malaya. Both were "an extractive (e.g. raw materials) colony 
which would return many times over whatever costs might have 
been incurred in getting it". 5 
Most importantly, this logic of imperialism did not 
apply when Britain added New Zealand to its colonial empire 
in 1840: 
Aotearoa was to be a white settler colony, an 
outcome of classical imperialism which developed 
according to totally different laws from that of 
• . • 6 
extractive or cheap labour colonies. 
Britain's desire to add New Zealand to her collection of 
"settler colonies" stemmed from the need of British 
capitalism to rid itself of a "surplus population'' rather 
than its need for raw materials: 
What British capitalism above all needed from what 
it called New Zealand, was a permanent open door 
to absorb its surplus population. It did not 
expect to receive a market, a source of food 
supply, or a cheap labour force to exploit. 7 
The annexation and subsequent colonization of New Zealand 
came about as a result of very different motives which 
5 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", D. Novitz and B. Willmott, Culture and 
Identity in New Zealand, G.P. books, 1989, p.24. 
6 'b'd ii., p.25. 
7 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
marked Britain's annexation and subsequent exploitation of 
her Indian and Malaysian colonies. 
84 
If a "settler colony" like New Zealand was to act as a 
sufficient magnet to draw this surplus population from home 
and family, it "must be maintained as a place which [was] 
considerably more attractive to poor people than the old 
one. 118 Steven argues that Britain's surplus population chose 
to emigrate rather than stay as a result of New Zealand 
being a "glorious country for a labouring man". The very 
nature of "settler capitalism" made it 
possible for underdeveloped capitalism, as 
Aotearoa was to become, to provide living and 
working conditions which were superior to those in 
more advanced capitalist Britain and which could 
therefore attract people from it. 9 
The existence of New Zealand as a "glorious country for a 
labouring man", however, was not simply the result of 
Britain's reluctance to exploit "settler colonies" in the 
same way as it exploited her Indian and Malaysian colonies. 
Extending his assertion that New Zealand developed as a 
result of her role as an attractive destination for British 
immigrants, Steven argues that conditions existed within New 
Zealand which allowed it to become unusually affluent. This 
extraordinary feature allowed a newly capitalist nation like 
New Zealand to evade the "norma,l laws of capitalist 
development" and provide British immigrants with a standard 
of living which exceeded that of an advanced capitalist 
8 ibid. 
9 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.25. 
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nation like Britain. In Steven's words, there was 
something in the colony which would work against 
the normal laws of capitalist development and 
offer them [the settlers] conditions which 
surpassed even those of the most advanced 
capitalist society at the time. 10 
That something was the unusually high quality of New 
Zealand's agricultural land. This "vastly superior colonial 
land" 11 enabled New Zealand to draw "differential rent" which 
provided ''settler capitalism" with a level of affluence not 
normally associated with newly capitalist countries: 
The distinctive characteristic of settler 
capitalism is that the high quality of the land 
expropriated by the settlers drew in differential 
rent and permitted a working class standard of 
living that is normally (if at all) associated 
only with advanced capitalism. 12 
This phenomenon of "differential rent 1113 enabled New 
Zealand to exploit Britain by obtaining some of the surplus 
produced by British workers: 
Far from British capitalists exploiting the 
workers of its colony, a situation closer to the 
reverse occurred: capitalists in New Zealand 
received some of the surplus created by British 
workers, and the colony was enriched at the 
expense of the imperialist power! 14 
The familiar spectre of an exploitative world system is 
adopted by Steven who gives it a new twist. He claims that 
10 , b, d l l ., p.26. 
11 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.45. 
12 'b, d l l ., p.51. 
13 Steven's use and misuse of this concept of 
"differential rent" will be discussed in greater detail in 
section (3.3) below. 
14 ibid., pp.49-50. 
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"differential rent" caused international trade to result in 
unequal exchange which allowed "settler capitalist" New 
Zealand to exploit "capitalist" Britain. 
The reasons for New Zealand's development as "a 
glorious country for a labouring man" stem from its ability 
to exploit Britain and the reluctance of Britain to exploit 
New Zealand. The cogency of Steven's explanation rests upon 
the validity of "differential rent" and New Zealand's 
function as an outlet for surplus population. As we have 
seen, the origins of this explanation are found in Steven's 
desire to show how New Zealand developed as a result of her 
role in "world imperialism". New Zealand's function as a 
"settler colony" allowed her to escape the normal fate 
mapped out for colonies by imperialism, and develop as a 
"glorious country for a labouring man". In order to sustain 
this explanation, Steven makes two crucial errors with 
regards to New Zealand history. The first involves his 
incorrect account for the annexation of New Zealand. The 
second involves his inability to show how New Zealand 
managed to exploit Britain. 
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(3.2) The Annexation of New Zealand. 
Steven's explanation for Britain's annexation of New 
Zealand is rather different from Bedggood's in its intent. 
Steven's theory of "settler capitalism1115 precludes him from 
arguing as Bedggood does that New Zealand was annexed in 
order to provide British capitalism with a source of raw 
materials. Rather than provide cheap raw materials for 
imperial Britain, settler colonies were annexed in order to 
provide an outlet for Britain's "surplus population": 
The only possible benefit which the Empire could 
derive from the annexation of Aotearoa was a free 
outlet for Britain's surplus population. 16 
Steven's departure from Bedggood is based upon his overall 
contention that Britain annexed New Zealand in order to 
"add" to her collection of "settler colonies". 17 
Steven argues that Britain's need for settler colonies 
arose from the inability of "voluntary immigration1118 to the 
United States and Canada to provide a sufficient outlet for 
her surplus population. Steven justifies this assumption by 
showing how the extent of emigration, which he notes 
15 R. Steven, 11 A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.44. 
16 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.23. 
17 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
18 ibid., p. 42. 
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"reached 100, 000 1119 by 1832, was still not sufficient to 
remove all the paupers which constituted Britain's surplus 
population. He then alleges that the cheaper cost of a 
passage across the Atlantic compared with that to the south 
Pacific precluded Australia from acting as a viable 
destination for Britain's "poor and unemployed 1120 • This cost 
disadvantage also precluded New Zealand from acting as an 
outlet for surplus population. Steven argues, however, that 
the "discovery1121 of assisted immigration in Australia in 
1831 effectively removed this barrier and paved the way for 
the annexation of New Zealand soon after in 1840. Annexation 
allowed the British crown and its agents, the land 
companies, to resell Maori land at an inflated or 
"sufficient price" .. The profits derived from the sale of 
land were then used to subsidize or "assist" the emigration 
of surplus population from Britain to New Zealand. The land 
obtained through annexation was, therefore, the linchpin of 
Britain's strategy to rid herself of surplus population by 
incorporating a "settler colony1122 such as New Zealand into 
her empire. 
It appears that Steven's explanation for annexation is 
19 ibid. This is a rather selective choice of statistics 
as 1832 was an exceptional year with 103,140 migrants 
leaving the United Kingdom. This number fell back to a more 
normal level of 62,527 in the following year. See: C.M.H. 
Clark, Select Documents in Australian History, p.214. 
20 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.22. 
21 • b. d l l ., p.23. 
22 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
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predicated on New Zealand's dual role as a source of land 
and as a dumping ground for surplus population. This 
explanation of events in 1840 is dubious, as it is based on 
assumptions incompatible with the historical record. I will 
show how the patterns of British emigration to New Zealand 
are not explicable by referring to Britain's exercise of 
direct rule in New Zealand. 
A decade after New Zealand was supposedly annexed in 
order to provide an additional outlet for Britain's surplus 
population, an overwhelming majority still chose "voluntary 
immigration" to the United States. During this period 63% of 
all those who emigrated from the United Kingdom arrived in 
the United States. 23 The continuing importance of the United 
States as an outlet for British migrants would appear to 
indicate that no connection exists between the exercise of 
British sovereignty and that country's ability to export its 
surplus population. This supposition is borne out when we 
find that emigration to New Zealand was at its lowest during 
the twelve years when the colony was directly administered 
by Britain. Consequently, Britain's acquisition of land 
through the annexation and direct administration of New 
Zealand did not enhance its ability to export surplus 
population. 
In 1852, just twelve years after annexation, Britain 
relinquished the direct administration of New Zealand and 
23 Of the 1,775,635 migrants who left the United Kingdom 
between 1840 and 1850, 1,135,198 arrived in the United 
States. See: C.M.H. Clark, Select Documents in Australian 
History, p.214. 
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granted the colonists the right of responsible government. 24 
During this period of direct British administration, the 
sale of land had assisted only a tiny proportion of 
Britain's surplus population to emigrate to New Zealand. By 
the time the companies and associations which had practised 
"assisted immigration" went out of existence in 1854 they 
had only managed to bring 15,612 immigrants to New Zealand. 25 
Conversely, the capacity of assisted immigration schemes to 
export this allegedly surplus population to New Zealand was 
at its height during the 1870 1 s. During this decade, the 
self governing colony instituted assisted immigration 
schemes which brought a further 115,000 settlers to New 
Zealand. 26 The existence of assisted immigration on this far 
more significant scale had nothing to do with Britain's need 
to export its surplus population and was simply the result 
of New Zealand's desire to expand its European population. 
Contrary to Steven's assertion, the historical record shows 
how a connection does not exist between the exercise of 
sovereignty and Britain's ability to relieve herself of 
surplus population. 
Furthermore, if New Zealand was annexed to provide an 
outlet for surplus population, Steven.must show that the 
motive which he ascribes to the annexers (namely the British 
24 R. Dalziel, "The Politics of Settlement", Oxford 
History of New Zealand, Oxford University Press, p.93. 
25 K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, Penguin books, 
1980, p.99. 
26 W.R. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, London, 1960, 
p.120. 
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government and the Colonial Office) was indeed held by them. 
Many politicians were aware of and indeed approved of 
Wakefield's theories of systematic colonization. Historical 
research indicates, however, that the Colonial Office was 
motivated by desires to protect the Maori population and 
impose law and order. Steven disregards this historiography 
by arguing that "imperialism already had a highly developed 
rationalizing ideology1127 • Humanitarian motives were, 
therefore, simply a smoke-screen which sought to disguise 
the real purpose behind annexation. It is plausible, 
however, that the aim of annexing New Zealand to relieve 
population pressure in Britain would have been well 
received, and would have made a "rationalizing ideology" 
unnecessary. Steven's argument is undermined by his 
inability to show that annexation for this purpose would 
have been regarded as a shabby rationale which had to be 
disguised by more acceptable aims. 
The main point is clear, the patterns of immigration to 
New Zealand do not conform to the contours set by Steven's 
explanation of annexation. We have already seen how large 
scale immigration to New Zealand was brought about by the 
gold rushes of the 1860 1 s and the desire of the colonists 
themselves to bring more Britons to New Zealand. The 
colonization of New Zealand was more dependent on these 
factors than on the recently "discovered" ability of Britain 
to export some of its surplus population to the south 
27 R. Steven, "Land and White settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.24. 
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Pacific. 28 Overall, there seems to be little correlation 
between the colonization of New Zealand and Britain's need 
to annex "settler colonies'' in order to gain an additional 
outlet for surplus population. 
By invoking New Zealand's role as an outlet for surplus 
population Steven has adopted an extremely problematic 
aspect of Bedggood's explanation for annexation. 29 Despite 
this apparent similarity, Steven's account of annexation 
marks a considerable advance on Bedggood's. Steven has 
realized what Bedggood has not, that unless Britain's 
surplus population were transported as convicts, some form 
of carrot was necessary to entice the "poor and unemployed 1130 
to emigrate to New Zealand. Consequently, Steven's theory of 
"settler capitalism" explains that New Zealand developed as 
"a glorious country for a labouring man 1131 in order to act as 
a sufficient magnet to draw surplus population away from the 
little security they had known in Britain. He argues that 
Britain, rather than exploiting New Zealand, had to ensure 
that her latest "settler colony" be "maintained as a place 
28 "It was because of the discovery that if the crown 
sold land to prospective settlers, subsidized emigration 
would be possible without any cost to the British tax-paying 
class. The only possible benefit which the empire could 
derive from the annexation of Aotearoa was a free outlet for 
Britain's surplus population." See: R. Steven, "Land and 
White Settler Colonialism: The Case of Aotearoa", pp.23. 
29 For a more detailed discussion of Bedggood's account 
of the annexation of New Zealand see section (2.3) above. 
30 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.22. 
31 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.44. 
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which is considerably more attractive to poor people than 
the old one". 32 Although this represents an improvement on 
Bedggood's ill-conceived explanation of New Zealand's role 
as a dumping ground for surplus population, Steven is still 
unable to save this problematic explanation of annexation. 
Steven claims that New Zealand developed as "a glorious 
country for a labouring man" on the basis of British 
benevolence and the ability of New Zealand to exploit 
Britain. Benevolence ensured that Britain intentionally 
pursued policies which ensured the well-being of the 
colonists: 
... the task of the British state was not to make 
the colony's capitalist development serve the 
needs of accumulation in Britain ... but to further 
the interests of the settlers. 33 
New Zealand's ability to exploit Britain came about as the 
result of the "unequal exchange" which Steven maintains 
characterized international trade. Although this portrayal 
of international trade appears identical to that put forward 
by the exponents of "world-systems analysis", Steven's 
theory of unequal exchange alters the pattern of 
exploitation propounded by Wallerstein and Bedggood. 
Consequently, Steven argues that international trade allowed 
New Zealand to transfer wealth created in Britain to itself: 
Trade therefore resulted in a net transfer of 
wealth from Britain to the colony, and not 
exploitation of the colony by imperialist powers 
32 ibid., p. 43 • 
33 ibid. ' p. 4 3. 
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as occurs in extractive or cheap labour colonies. 34 
While I will show how Steven's argument on unequal exchange 
precludes his conclusion that New Zealand was "a glorious 
country for a labouring man", 35 I will examine his other 
claim that British benevolence was part of the reason for 
New Zealand's existence as a workers' utopia. 
In order to support his theory of British benevolence, 
Steven claims that certain key episodes in New Zealand 
history appear to be the result of British policy which 
intended to further the interests of the settlers. One 
episode refers to the colony being granted "responsible 
government" in 1852 while the other refers to the provision 
of British troops in the Anglo-Maori wars of the 1860's. 
Jumping enthusiastically into the perilous waters of 
counterfactual history, Steven claims that if it were not 
for British benevolence then the achievement of "self 
government would have required some kind of revolutionary 
struggle". 36 While Steven may be able to show that 
11 independence" was "handed over on a plate", 37 he is not 
justified to assume that had this not happened some kind of 
revolutionary struggle would have ensued. This kind of 'what 
if' scenario, although interesting, does not form the basis 
34 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.28. 
35 See section (3.3) below. 
36 R. Steven, "Land and White Settler Colonialism: The 
Case of Aotearoa", p.27. 
37 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
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of sound historical explanation. 38 Furthermore, by referring 
to "responsible government" as "self government", Steven is 
exposing his weakness as a constitutional historian. 
Steven highlights another episode which he claims 
reinforces his theory that Britain acted benevolently 
towards the settlers: The participation of British troops in 
the Anglo-Maori wars. He argues that this costly military 
action was undertaken in order to "secure Maori land for 
present and future immigrants". 39 The benevolence adduced 
from this episode is not as clear cut as Steven makes out. 
The hasty withdrawal of British troops left many settlers 
wondering whether the British government looked favourably 
upon their cause. Indeed, subsequent debate in the New 
Zealand parliament was punctuated by the distaste which many 
members expressed for what they felt was the overly hasty 
withdrawal of the eighteenth regiment. 40 
A more fundamental objection concerns Steven's 
assumption that imperial troops were deployed in order to 
satiate the land hunger of the settlers. A cursory 
examination of the invasion of the Waikato would appear to 
offer some plausibility to Steven's claim. The fertile lands 
of the Waikato tribes were confiscated while the less 
38 For a discussion of the perils of "counterfactual 
history" and the "fallacy of fictional questions" see D.H. 
Fischer, Historians' Fallacies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1971. 
39 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
40 See the long running debate on the "Conduct of the 
Imperial Government" in New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 
vols. 7,8., 1870. 
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attractive lands of the Ngatimaniapoto were left untouched. 
Hence, the true purpose behind the wars could be interpreted 
as an attempt to satiate the land hunger of the settlers. 41 
This unhappy coincidence was more the result of strategic 
considerations rather than a confirmation of the land hunger 
thesis. General Cameron's advance did not reach 
Ngatimaniapoto land on account of the difficulties it 
presented his troops. Rather than confiscate Maori land, it 
would appear that the most compelling reason for the 1863 
invasion of the Waikato was the desire to crush the 
independent power of the Maoris. A leading historian on the 
topic argues that Anglo-Maori wars "must be explained as a 
complex social movement involving much more than land 
hunger. 1142 
Were Steven to resolve this contradiction regarding the 
role of land within his model of "settler capitalism", the 
validity of his explanation of annexation would also depend 
upon his ability to show that New Zealand was a "glorious 
country for a labouring man". Although New Zealand was in 
many respects a working man's utopia, 43 Steven assumes this 
was the product of British benevolence and New Zealand's 
41 Alan Ward notes that the term II land wars II evolved in 
the context of explanations couched in these terms. A. Ward, 
"The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars: A Reconsideration", 
New Zealand Journal of History, vol.1., No.2., 1967, pp.148-
9. 
42 A. Ward, "The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars: A 
Reconsideration", New Zealand Journal of History, vol.1., 
No.2., 1967, p.170. 
43 M. Fairburn, The Ideal Society and its Enemies, 
Auckland University Press, 1989. 
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ability to exploit Britain. This assumption precludes 
definitive conclusion. The following section will show how 
the assumption that New Zealand exploited Britain is based 
on a theory of international trade which is clearly false. 
Unable to prove that New Zealand was a "glorious country for 
a labouring man", Steven's explanation of annexation and the 
theoretical edifice of "settler capitalism'' are left in 
tatters. 
(3.3) A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man. 
The vision of New Zealand as a working man's paradise 
was so widely held among the settlers that it has become 
part of the mythology which pervades any account of the 
colonial past. Any assessment of the content or validity of 
this mythology is beyond the scope of this discussion and is 
dealt with with greater rigour elsewhere. 44 The focus of this 
discussion concentrates on the validity of Steven's 
explanation of New Zealand's development as a "glorious 
country for a labouring man". He argues that New Zealand's 
development as a working man's paradise is partially 
explained by Britain's need to rid itself of "surplus 
population1145 • In its capacity as a dumping ground for 
Britain's poor and unemployed, the newest "settler colony 1146 
44 A recent and perceptive discussion of this mythology 
is found in: M. Fairburn, The Ideal Society and its Enemies. 
45 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.43. 
46 ibid. 
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was spared the exploitation usually meted out to British 
colonies. This non-exploitation only forms part of Steven's 
explanation of New Zealand's development however. In a 
profound reversal of the normal patterns of imperialism, 
Steven argues that New Zealand was able to exploit 
imperialist Britain. Consequently, a large measure of the 
colony's affluence did not result from the creation of 
wealth and opportunities in New Zealand but through the 
successful expropriation of the "surplus created by British 
workers". 47 While this turns the "world-systems analysis" of 
Wallerstein on its head, Steven's account is still couched 
in the familiar terms of an exploitative world economy which 
transfers surplus from one country to another. 
Regardless of which country benefits from exploitation, 
Wallerstein, Bedggood and Steven all agree that "unequal 
exchange" is the principal mechanism which enables certain 
countries to exploit others. Unequal exchange occurs when 
prices depart from values so that one trading partner 
receives more value than another for commodities which 
exchange at the same price. Reaffirming this claim, Steven 
writes 
Unequal exchange refers to the process by which 
commodities embodying different quantities of 
social labour (value] are exchanged at uniform 
prices. 48 
Put simply, the very act of exchanging commodities results 
in exploitation. 
47 'b'd 1 1 ., p.50. 
48 R. Steven, "Towards a Class Analysis of New Zealand", 
p. 116. 
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As we have already rejected accounts of exploitation 
put forward by Wallerstein and Bedggood, an examination of 
Steven's theory of unequal exchange may seem a needless 
repetition. Such an examination is useful, however, as any 
attempt to improve the theories of unequal exchange advanced 
by Wallerstein and Bedggood must proceed along the lines of 
Steven's more rigorous formulation. Consequently, any hopes 
of saving the arguments of Wallerstein and Bedggood rest on 
the validity of Steven's theory of unequal exchange. 
More importantly, this discussion will show us how the 
theories of value and price derived from Marxist economics 
do not constitute a valid basis for any coherent theory of 
exploitation. The following discussion is, therefore, an 
emphatic rejection of the models of surplus transfer which 
constitute the basis of nee-Marxist theories of economic 
development. 
It is important to note that Marxist economics is 
unique among economic theories for insisting that 
commodities within a capitalist system can be simultaneously 
analyzed in terms of value and price. 49 Therefore, any 
discussion of unequal exchange which is formulated in terms 
of a difference between value and price is necessarily 
locked into Marxist economics. The following discussion will 
examine and reject the Marxist treatment of value and price 
which lies at the heart of Steven's notion of unequal 
exchange. 
49 M. Blaug, A Methodological Appraisal of Marxian 
Economics, North-Holland, 1980, p.5. 
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If we examine a simple model of commodity exchange we 
find that the ratio at which one commodity is exchanged for 
another varies in accordance with the actual commodities 
being exchanged. For example, one fish may exchange for 
three oranges or four apples. In exchange therefore, the 
worth of a commodity is a relative magnitude. Marxists claim 
that beneath the relative world of exchange lies an absolute 
measurement of a commodity's worth. This absolute measure of 
worth is known as a commodity's "value" which Marxists claim 
is determined by the amount of labour time required to 
produce that commodity under standard conditions of 
production. It is, therefore, possible to think of the worth 
of a commodity as existing simultaneously on two levels. The 
relative measure of a commodity's worth is determined by the 
price for which it is sold. The absolute measure of a 
commodity's worth is determined by its value, that is, the 
socially necessary labour time required to produce it. 50 
An analysis of the value of a commodity is inextricably 
linked to the production of that commodity. The process of 
production involves using up other commodities such as raw 
materials, machinery and labour. Of all the commodities used 
in production, labour is the only one which is seen as 
capable of adding value to the other factors of production. 
It is this allegedly unique ability of labour to create 
value which lies at the heart of the Marxist explanation of 
profit. The value magnitude of profit is the difference 
50 The term "socially necessary" refers to the average 
degree of skill, technology and intensity of labour 
prevalent in a particular society. 
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between the value of the product which workers produce and 
the value they receive as payment for their labour. Marxists 
refer to this difference as "surplus value". This analysis 
of the value magnitude of profit forms the basis of Steven's 
claim that "the source of the capitalist's profit is the 
surplus value produced by the working class". 51 
While Marxists claim that it is theoretically possible 
to determine the value magnitude of profit by referring to 
the production of a commodity, the actual profits which the 
capitalist receives are determined at the point of exchange. 
More importantly, the profit which capitalists in any 
particular industry or firm receive does not reflect 
"surplus value created by workers 1152 in that industry or firm 
at the point of production. If the actual profit received by 
capitalists were wholly determined by the amount of surplus 
value produced by their own workers, then the most 
profitable industries would be those creating the most 
surplus value. Since labour is said to be the source of 
value, it also follows that the most labour intensive 
industries create the most value. It is precisely this point 
that Steven wishes to. emphasize when he explains that 
you would find that the more labour intensive 
industries with many workers contributing surplus 
value, such as clothing, would yield very high 
profit rates, while ones with relatively few 
workers and not so much surplus value, such as 
automated motor vehicle assemblies, would make 
very little profit. Speculators in the foreign 
exchange or gold markets, who hire no workers at 
51 R. Steven, "Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: 
Marxist Theory", p.48. 
52 'b'd 1 1 ., p.49. 
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all, would make nothing at all. 53 
Mindful of the profitability of equity markets, Steven 
concludes that the profit received by capitalists does not 
correspond to the surplus value produced by the workforce 
they employ. 
Steven explains the disparity between the amount of 
surplus value produced in a particular industry and the 
actual profit received by that industry's capitalists by 
referring to the way in which values are transformed into 
prices. Before we look closely at this transformation it is 
important to identify the factors which set the pric~ of 
commodities at levels which depart from their value. Steven 
maintains that prices are affected by the movement of 
capital from the least profitable to the most profitable 
areas of production. This movement of capital will result in 
an increased supply of high profit products which will 
reduce their price and hence their profitability. 
Conversely, the reduced supply of low profit products will 
raise their prices and profitability. This flow of capital 
will, therefore, result in an equilibrium rate of profit 
being established for all producers. This is the basis of 
Steven's claim that the 
prices of different commodities, therefore, settle 
at levels which give capital in the different 
industries the same average rate of profit on the 
total amounts of money they[sic] invest. 54 
Having noted this explanation for the formation of price, we 
53 'b'd l l ., p.48. 
54 ibid., pp.48-9. Bad grammar in the original. 
' 
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will now move on to the more important issue regarding the 
transformation of values into price. Steven tries to show 
how the transformation of values into prices causes "surplus 
value" created in the clothing industry, in this instance, 
to be transferred to the automobile industry. His argument 
is stated in the algebraic formulation given as: 55 
AUTO 
CLOTHING 
C + V + S 
90 + 10 + 10 = 
= 
110 
70 + 30 + 30 = 
y 
120 
130 
pp 
+10 
120 
C: value of constant capital (means of 
production) 
V: value of variable capital (wages) 
S: surplus value produced 
Y: total value of commodity 
PP: production price56 
D 
-10 
D: difference between total value and production price 
By citing this example, Steven shows that, if profits were 
determined by the amount of surplus value produced, then the 
55 The "transformation problem" is invariably found in 
this algebraic format. Of the many examples which can be 
found throughout Steven's articles this particular example 
is found in R. Steven, "Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value", 
p.49. 
56 "Prices of production" are given as: C + V + the 
value equivalent to the average profit. 
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clothing industry would return a 30% profit compared with 
10% from the automobile industry. 57 The transformation of 
"values" into "prices of production", however, causes the 
actual rate of profit received by capitalists in both 
industries to be equalized at 20%. This equalization 
represents a transfer of surplus value from the clothing to 
the automobile industry. 
Above all else, this transformation shows how the 
amount of "surplus value" which is distributed to individual 
capitalists does not correspond to the amount of "surplus 
value" produced by their workforce. This forms the basis of 
Steven's claim that 
the price mechanism distributes surplus value, and 
so ensures the profitability of an industry, not 
according to how much surplus value workers in it 
create, but according to the total surplus value 
produced by the entire working class and the 
amount of money capitalists invest in the 
industry. 58 
The way in which prices depart from values to transfer 
"surplus value" from one industry to another forms the basis 
of Steven's theory of unequal exchange between countries. A 
critical evaluation of this theory of unequal exchange will, 
therefore, serve as a useful prologue to Steven's discussion 
of international trade and New Zealand's exploitation of 
Britain. 
The first objection to Steven's theory of unequal 
exchange stems from contradictions which are inherent in his 
57 If the rate of profit is given as S / (C+V) 
then, the rate of profit for Auto= 10 / 90+10 or 10% 
and the rate of profit for Clothing= 30 / 70+30 or 30% 
58 R. Steven, "Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value", p. 52. 
105 
definition of value. Steven makes statements about the 
'determination' and 'creation' of value as if both terms 
were interchangeable in a Marxist discussion of value. 
Consequently, statements such as, "the value of each 
commodity" is equivalent to the "socially necessary time 
required to produce it", 59 are followed by statements 
regarding the "surplus value created by workers". 60 This 
conflation of 'creation' and 'determination' amounts to an 
evasion of the controversy surrounding the Marxist debate 
over the labour theory of value. What is required is an 
untangling of the notions regarding the creation and 
determination of value and an analysis of the causal link 
between them. While the term 'create' refers to the actual 
creation of the value embodied in a commodity, the term 
'determine' refers to the magnitude of that commodity's 
value. Marxists normally refer to the determination and 
creation of value as two separate propositions which are 
represented by the statements: 
(1) value is determined by socially necessary labour 
time 
(2) value is created by labour. 
The following paragraph will show that if the value of a 
commodity is determined by the socially necessary labour 
required to produce it, then labour cannot create value. 61 
59 'b. d l l ., p.48. 
60 'b 'd 4 l l ., p. 9. 
61 The following argument is found in G.A. Cohen, "The 
Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation", I. 
Steedman, The Value Controversy, Verso Editions, 1981. 
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Quite simply, if statement (1) is true, statement (2) must 
be false. 
If labour creates value, then the labour expended to 
produce a commodity will determine its value. This truth 
will hold regardless of the particular moment at which that 
commodity was produced or the efficiency of the labour used 
to produce it. If value is determined by socially necessary 
labour time, however, then the amount of labour actually 
expended to produce a commodity is strictly irrelevant to 
its value. The value of a commodity will be determined by 
the socially necessary labour required to reproduce it at 
the exact moment we wish to determine its value. The 
incompatibility of statements (1) and (2) was apparent to 
Marx when he wrote: 
The value of every commodity ... is determined not 
by the necessary labour-time contained in it, but 
by the social labour-time required for its 
reproduction. 62 
Although Marx was aware of this valuable distinction he 
proceeded to ignore it just as Steven does. The main point 
is clear however: if value is determined by socially 
necessary labour time, then value cannot be created by the 
labour which was expended to produce that commodity. 
A possible response to my criticism that these two 
statements are contradictory is to advance a mixed 
formulation which says that (2) is true so long as it 
corresponds with (1). This mixed formulation would, 
Q 't 1 K. Marx, Cap1 a, vol.3., Moscow, 1966, p.141. 
Reproduced in G.A. Cohen, "The Labour Theory of Value and 
the Concept of Exploitation", pp.210-11. 
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therefore, appear along the lines of: 
(3) labour creates value, if and only if, the labour 
required to produce that commodity is socially necessary. 
Unfortunately, this mixed formulation is still subject to my 
original criticism that if value is determined by socially 
necessary labour then the amount of labour expended to 
produce a commodity is strictly irrelevant to its value. 
In the light of this objection we may well question the 
validity of analyzing the process of exchange by referring 
to the value of a commodity. Even if Steven were to define 
value adequately in non-contradictory terms, he would still 
be unable to determine the actual level of profits without 
referring to the price of commodities. In short, Steven's 
notion of value is redundant to any explanation of prices 
and the actual profits received by capitalists. Steedman's 
rejection of the Marxist definition of value re-iterates the 
same point: 
Since the profit rate and all prices of production 
can be determined without reference to any value 
magnitude, the 'transformation problem' is a 
pseudo-problem, a chimera63 . 
It would appear that one of Steven's reasons for maintaining 
this theory of value is that it appears to buttress his 
conclusion that trade results in unequal exchange. 64 Steven 
cannot show that values determine prices, however, and his 
63 I. Steedman, Marx After Sraffa, Verso Editions, 1981, 
pp.14-15. 
64 Steven has a more basic purpose for maintaining this 
redundant theory of value. This is done in order to maintain 
a theory of exploitation of workers by capitalists. This 
motive was drawn to my attention by G.A. Cohen, "The Labour 
Theory of,Value and the Concept of Exploitation", p.214. 
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theory of unequal exchange can only be based on a comparison 
of values with prices. Put another way, unequal exchange is 
predicated on a comparison of what Steven believes ought to 
be (values) and what actually is (prices). 
Having found that Steven's theory of unequal exchange 
is logically flawed, we will examine its use in his 
discussion of New Zealand history. We have seen how part of 
Steven's explanation of New Zealand's development as a 
"glorious country for a labouring man" is founded on the 
colony's ability to exploit Britain: 
Far from British capitalists exploiting the 
workers of its colony, a situation closer to the 
reverse occurred: capitalists in New Zealand 
received some of the surplus created by British 
workers, and the colony was enriched at the 
expense of the imperialist power! 1165 
Reaffirmation his flawed theory of unequal exchange, Steven 
attempts to show how international trade allowed New Zealand 
to exploit Britain. Steven claims that a system of unequal 
exchange characterized the trade which saw New Zealand 
export agricultural products in exchange for British 
manufactured goods. As a result, the agricultural 
commodities New Zealand exported to Britain had a lower 
value than the manufactured products they were exchanged 
for. In our earlier discussion of commodity exchange we saw 
how the factors which determined price caused the price of a 
commodity to diverge from its value. In the process of 
exchange, value is transferred, via the price mechanism, 
from one producer to another. Steven claims that 
65 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
pp.49-50. 
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"differential rent" ensures that the price of a commodity 
departs from its value in a way which ensures that "surplus 
value" created i~Britain is transferred to New Zealand: 
... international trade can under certain 
circumstances redistribute as differential rent to 
a food producing capitalist system surplus value 
which is created elsewhere.M 
Steven's argument that international trade transfers surplus 
from Britain to New Zealand begins with a discussion of the 
way in which "differential rent" determines the price of 
agricultural commodities. 
Steven explains that the price of the agricultural 
commodities New Zealand exported to Britain were determined 
by the profit received by the farmer working the least 
profitable land. He defends this explanation by arguing that 
the least profitable farms must receive the "average" rate 
of profit due to all capitalists, otherwise they would drop 
out of production altogether: 
... if capital could not get the average rate of 
return on the money invested on this worst land, 
it would not do so and the land would not be 
worked. 67 
Those agricultural producers not farming the "worst land" 
would, therefore, receive profits in excess of the normal 
"rate of return". It is this difference between the profits 
obtained on the "best" and "worst" land which constitutes 
the basis of "differential rent": 
This is called differential rent because of the 
differential costs of producing on the worst land, 
which regulates the selling price of food, and the 
M ibid., p.49. 
67 ibid. 
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costs on this better land.~ 
The existence of land of "unusual fertility in an 
unusually temperate climate1169 allowed New Zealand farmers to 
obtain profits in excess of the normal profits returned by 
other areas of production such as manufacturing. 
Consequently, 
the labour needed to make agricultural products on 
superior land is much less than the labour that 
goes into what you can exchange for these 
products. 70 
In this way, 
their monopolization of vastly superior colonial 
land enabled them [the settlers] to obtain, as 
profit, some of the surplus produced by British 
workers in the form of what is called differential 
rent. 71 
Differential rent, therefore, allowed New Zealand 
agriculture to receive as profit more value than had been 
produced in the colony itself. Essentially, New Zealand 
exported commodities which contained less value (in the form 
of socially necessary labour) than their price reflected. In 
this way, New Zealand was able exploit Britain and develop 
as a "glorious country for a labouring man". 
While Steven is correct in drawing attention to the 
cost competitiveness of. New Zealand agriculture, his reasons 
for doing so are somewhat inadequate. As we have already 
noted, New Zealand was certainly no more fertile than 
~ ibid. 
~ ibid., p. 45 . 
ro ibid. 
n ibid. 
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Britain. 72 Although Steven's explanation of differential 
rent is based on incorrect assumptions about the land's 
fertility, he would still be able to show that the labour 
input required to produce agricultural commodities in New 
Zealand was lower than it was in Britain. My rejection of 
the theory of value transfer via differential rent will, 
however, focus on its flawed logic rather than Steven's 
slightly misleading assumptions regarding fertility. 
In Steven's earlier example, the transformation of 
values into prices caused "surplus value" to be transferred 
from the clothing to the automobile industry. Likewise, 
"surplus value" is transferred from Britain to New Zealand 
in exactly the same fashion. New Zealand's exploitation of 
Britain was simply the result of the colony's receiving as 
profit, value which was produced in Britain. "Differential 
rent" is, therefore, little more than a re-affirmation of 
Steven's flawed theory of unequal exchange and is therefore 
subject to the same criticism. Without repeating my earlier 
objections I will simply note how Steven's theory of 
"differential rent" is based on a comparison of value and 
price. By his own admission, price is determined by the rate 
of profit on the least fertile land and value is determined 
by the amount of socially necessary labour required to 
produce a commodity. As Steven cannot plausibly show how 
values are transformed into prices, his explanation of New 
Zealand's exploitation of Britain is based on nothing more 
n For a discussion of the comparative fertility of New 
Zealand and England see section (2.2) above. 
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than a comparison of what is (price) with what Steven 
believes ought to be (value). 
Even if my rejection of differential rent was 
incorrect, further examination will reveal another crucial 
error. If we accept Steven's claim that "superior colonial 
land" enabled the New Zealand farmer to reap differential 
rent, what are the barriers facing British capitalists in 
moving from manufacturing and marginal agriculture in 
Britain into agricultural production in New Zealand? 
Eventually, the flow of capital in search of maximum profit 
would ensure that the differential in profitability which 
exists between Britain and New Zealand will reach an 
equilibrium as prices fall to their values. Steven 
explicitly rejects such an equilibrium being reached. He 
argues that 
land ownership confers a power to charge a price 
for the use of land in excess of the value (the 
labour under average social conditions) that has 
gone into the land.TI 
The basis of Steven's claim that land ownership confers 
monopoly powers is founded on the existence of land as a 
finite resource, that is, extra land cannot be produced by 
human labour. Steven erroneously concludes that this limit 
on agricultural production prevents production from 
expanding in order to bring prices down. In his own words: 
p.48. 
the ownership of something that cannot be made by 
any human effort, such as land (or anything in the 
land), but which is needed in the production of a 
commodity, for example food, restricts the 
competitive pressures on the price of that 
TI R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
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commodity. It prevents other capitalists from 
entering the industry, producing more of the 
commodity, and thus bidding down its price. 74 
The obvious implication of this theory of monopoly is that 
New Zealand agricultural producers were able to charge a 
price in excess of the value of commodities they exported to 
Britain. From the mid- nineteenth century onwards New 
Zealand was able to exploit Britain by obtaining as profit 
value which had been produced there. As a student of New 
Zealand history, Steven should realize that this concept of 
monopoly does not apply to the period when New Zealand began 
to export wool and later, refrigerated meat and dairy 
products to Britain. At this time new land in countries like 
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, was being opened up 
and brought into agricultural production. 
An equally obvious rebuttal to Steven's notion of 
monopoly would note that the application of technology in 
the post war period seems to indicate that a finite amount 
of land did not put a ceiling on agricultural output. If we 
take the example of the United States, agricultural output 
per hectare had risen by an unprecedented 49% between 1950 
and 1970. 75 Even more impressive improvements are to be found 
in British and French productivity per hectare, improving by 
~ 'b'd l l • 
75 output per hectare was .655 wheat units in 1950 and 
.981 wheat units in 1970. See: J.W. Kendrick and N. Vaccara, 
New Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis, 
pp.572-3. 
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62% and 141% respectively.~ This notion of monopoly would, 
therefore, require substantial modification if Steven is to 
propose any coherent theory which shows how surplus is 
transferred from Britain to New Zealand via differential 
rent. As a final criticism of Steven's claim that New 
Zealand exploited Britain, I will show that his theory of 
differential rent, when defended by this notion of monopoly, 
is undermined by his inability to show that labour creates 
value. 
If land ownership confers monopoly powers on the owner, 
then Steven is forced to conclude that: 
.•. products of something like land can thus be 
sold at prices above their value, the work that 
has gone into them under average conditions. Food 
can thus be exchan~ed for commodities of greater 
value than itself. 
The ownership of land therefore is one of the mechanisms 
which determines price. The crucial point is that the 
ownership of "vastly superior colonial land" 78 ensured that 
differential rent distributed surplus value created in 
Britain to New Zealand: 
The redistribution of surplus value via 
differential rent to the landowners is also a 
redistribution of surplus value created by British 
workers to the settlers in Aotearoa. 79 
76 British output per hectare was 1.61 wheat units in 
1950 and 2.61 in 1970. French agricultural output per 
hectare was 1.53 wheat units in 1950 and 3.70 in 1970. See: 
ibid., pp.570-73. 
77 R. Steven, "A Glorious Country for a Labouring Man", 
p.48. 
78 'b'd l l ., p.45. 
79 'b'd l l ., p.49. 
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The implication of Steven's argument need to be spelled out. 
Although the ownership·of the means of production gives the 
capitalist access to value, labour and labour alone creates 
value. In Steven's own words, "the truth of the matter is 
that workers create but capitalists get hold of wealth''.M As 
we have already seen, however, Steven's definition of value 
as socially necessary labour time specifically precludes 
labour from creating value. Consequently, Steven's claim 
that differential rent enabled New Zealand to exploit 
Britain is undermined by the inability of his theory of 
unequal exchange to show that labour creates value. 
In conclusion, Steven's adherence to the principles of 
Marxian economics and particularly, his adoption of the 
problematic labour theory of value has led to crucial errors 
in his explanation of New Zealand history. Although we have 
raised several objections two central errors stand out. 
Firstly, land was not the linchpin of "settler capitalism". 
Land did not enable New Zealand to act as an outlet for 
surplus population, nor did it form the basis of New 
Zealand's ability to exploit Britain. Finally, the high 
standard of living which made New Zealand a "glorious 
country for a labouring man" was not the result of a system 
of unequal exchange which transferred surplus value created 
in Britain to the colony. 
ao ibid., p. 47 • 
Chapter Four: ARMSTRONG AND DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT IN NEW 
ZEALAND. 
(4.1) Dominion capitalism. 
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Like others influenced by the nee-Marxism of 
Wallerstein, Armstrong argues that New Zealand, and nations 
like her, lie between the "central" and "peripheral" poles 
of the "world capitalist system". 1 This "intermediate group" 
which Armstrong labels "dominion capitalist" is made up of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Uruguay and 
exhibits characteristics of "developed" and "underdeveloped" 
nations. 2 As a "dominion capitalist" state, New Zealand 
therefore enjoyed a level of affluence which was normally 
associated with advanced capitalism while also displaying 
all the hallmarks of dependent development. Armstrong 
alludes to this seemingly paradoxical nature of "dominion 
capitalism" when he notes that 
Despite its high living standards and apparently 
developed economy, Canada, like New Zealand and 
Australia, manifests many of the symptoms of 
dependent, uneven development. 3 
It is noteworthy that Donald Denoon, while analyzing a 
similar group of states which he labels "settler 
1 W. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: The Origins 
of Dominion Capitalism", W.E. Willmott, New Zealand and the 
World; Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Rosenburg, University of 
Canterbury, 1980, p.28. 
2 'b'd 1 1 . 
3 w. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, vol.13-14., 1977-78., p.298. 
capitalist", draws attention to the 
apparent paradox, whereby societies which were 
highly dependent were remarkably dynamic, and did 
accomplish such a measure of development that -
albeit briefly- they seemed about to replicate the 
achievements of the United States. 4 
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Although Denoon and Armstrong stress some different points 
of comparison, both "settler capitalism" and "dominion 
capitalism" share an identical core of states made up of 
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Uruguay. To this core, 
Armstrong adds Canada and Denoon adds South Africa and 
Chile. Despite these additions, both authors stress the 
unusual combination of affluence and dependence which 
characterize these 'regions of recent settlement•. While 
Armstrong observes that the "real levels of remuneration 
approximate or exceed those of western Europe"5 Denoon writes 
of the "tremendous wealth and rapid demographic growth" 
generated by "settler capitalism116 • Both authors maintain 
that despite the remarkable wealth of settler societies, 
these nations did not develop diversified and industrialized 
economies in the way that the United States did. Denoon 
claims the course of "dependent development" "did not lead 
in general to diversification of production"7 while Armstrong 
4 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of 
Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, Oxford 
University Press, 1983, p.14. 
5 w. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: A 
First Statement", Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 13-14., 1977-78., p.352. 
6 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of 
Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, p.228. 
7 ibid., p.223. 
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laments the "history of under-lying dependence and of 
blocked, lop-sided development 118 which resulted in industrial 
production being "based primarily upon the first processing 
stages of primary production or upon import substitution". 9 
Considering the similarities shared by "dominion capitalism" 
and "settler capitalism", it would be instructive to ask why 
Armstrong should include Canada while excluding South Africa 
and Chile. The answer to this question, although dealt with 
later, 10 will enable us to determine the validity of 
Armstrong's claim that the group of nations which he labels 
"dominion capitalist" forms a "distinctive category within 
the world economy". 11 
Armstrong argues that "dominion capitalist" states 
occupied a subordinate position within the "world economy". 
This subordination originated with the incorporation of 
these states into the colonial empire of Great Britain. 
Within this structure of British imperialism, countries like 
New Zealand were "incorporated into the world division of 
labour as producers of staple commodities for export to the 
imperial centre". 12 Armstrong claims that New Zealand's role 
8 w. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.299. 
9 w. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: A 
F1rst statement", p.352. 
10 Refer to section ( 4. 2) . 
11 W. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: 
A First Statement•, p.352. 
12 w. 4rmstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: The Origins 
of Dominion capitalism", p.40. 
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as an "imperial farm 1113 suited the "requirements" of the 
"British economy going through the second industrial 
revolution. 1114 In a re-affirmation of the nee-Marxist 
argument, Armstrong notes how this role coincided with the 
needs of British capitalism, which he claims was on the 
lookout for cheap raw materials, an outlet for surplus 
population and a source of new investment opportunities: 
Britain needed overseas markets for its 
manufactured goods and for its surplus capital. 
Equally it required outlets for a "surplus" and 
potentially explosive population which industrial 
capitalism could not absorb at home. And finally, 
it needed access to sources of raw materials for 
its factories, and cheap food for its urban 
workers to keep production costs low. 15 
Even if Britain did require these things, we have already 
seen how the existence of a causal relationship between 
these "needs" of British capitalism and the annexation, 
colonization and subsequent development of New Zealand is 
highly questionable. Indeed Armstrong admits that an 
explanation of the annexation of New Zealand made in these 
terms is subject to an objection based on New Zealand's 
inability to meet these needs in any significant way. With 
respect to New Zealand's role as an "imperial farm", he 
concludes that the "lack of immediately observable resources 
in the new colony for some decades [after annexation] made 
13 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.301. 
14 • b. d l l ., p.299. 
15 W. Armstrong, "Industrialization and Class Structure 
in Australia, Canada and Argentina: 1870 to 1980 11 , E.L. 
Wheelwright and K. Buckley, Essays in the Political Economy 
of Australian Capitalism, vol.5., Australian and New Zealand 
books, 1983, p.49. 
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it a dubious acquisition for Britain. 1116 It was only with the 
advent of refrigeration three decades later that New Zealand 
assumed a useful role in the provision of cheap foodstuffs 
for Britain's industrial workforce. 
Mindful of the pitfalls of explaining events such as 
the annexation by referring solely to the needs of British 
capitalism, Armstrong makes less grandiose claims with 
regard to the place of New Zealand history within the 
context of imperialism. Although, dependence upon British 
markets, capital, technology and immigration exerted an 
important influence on the nature and outcome of New 
Zealand's development, that dependence must not be regarded 
as the sole determinant of the colony's development. This 
vital distinction regarding the role of dependence is 
emphasised by Armstrong: 
Dependence upon imperial centres has clearly 
conditioned the scope, rate and pattern of New 
Zealand's development throughout its evolution 
from colony to nee-colony. 17 
While this position marks a considerable improvement on the 
rigidly deterministic analysis of Bedggood, Armstrong still 
maintains that "dependence" is an important factor in his 
explanation of development. 
Although Denoon uses the term "settler capitalist" to 
refer to the unique experience of those settler societies he 
investigates he is not an economic determinist in the same 
16 W. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: The Origins 
of Dominion Capitalism", p.38. 
17 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.297. 
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mould as Wallerstein, Bedggood, Steven and Armstrong. Denoon 
specifically rejects the approach of world-systems analysis, 
with its emphasis on "international relations of dominance 
and dependence". He deems this approach as an inadequate 
explanation of the development of settler societies like New 
Zealand. 18 Instead, Denoon regards the national histories of 
the settler societies he investigates as a crucial rebuttal 
to world systems analysis. Referring to the dependency 
school which marked the crude beginnings of world-systems 
analysis, Denoon is derisory of the use of dependency as an 
explanation of a country's development: 
If dependency theory has identified important 
questions, its narrow concern with international 
relations [of "dominance and dependence"] prevents 
it from answering those questions. 19 
Although Denoon wishes to explain the existence of 
dependency in those societies he investigates, he does not 
attempt to use dependency as an explanation of their 
development. His evocation of a "settler capitalist" group 
of states does not therefore make the same claims as similar 
terms used by nee-Marxists influenced by Wallerstein. Having 
noted this fundamental difference separating Denoon and 
Armstrong it is important to place Armstrong within the 
context of other nee-Marxist approaches to New Zealand 
history. 
As we have already seen, Wallerstein and Bedggood 
describe the world economy as a "zero-sum game" where the 
18 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of 
Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, p.11. 
19 ibid., p. 221. 
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rich get richer as a result of the poor becoming poorer. 
Although Steven's approach is more sophisticated he still 
attempts to explain New Zealand's development by referring 
to the supposed transfer of surplus brought about by the 
unequal exchange of international trade. In a significant 
departure from these nee-Marxist portrayals of the world 
economy, Armstrong's concept of "dominion capitalism" makes 
no reference to the transfer of surplus via unequal 
exchange. This revision of the normal nee-Marxist approach 
hopes to show how 
the role played by each society in the 
international capitalist system is treated as an 
expression of the relationship between the 
domestic ruling class and external forces. 20 
The affluence and dependence which characterizes a "dominion 
capitalist" state such as New Zealand is, therefore, 
explained by referring to the policies implemented by a 
ruling group acting in concert with the imperatives of 
imperialism. By referring to the twin forces of class 
structure and imperialism, Armstrong hopes to explain 
important shifts in the pattern of New Zealand's 
development. This pattern of development was marked by a 
transition from a society containing the germs of 
an independent, autocentric industrial capitalist 
development to one of monocultural, extraverted 
specialization in the production of primary raw 
material for the 'mother country•. 112 
This shift from an independent and diversified economy 
20 w. Armstrong, "Industrialization and Class Structure 
in Australia, Canada and Argentina", p.44. 
21 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.300. 
123 
towards specialization and dependence is explained by the 
cosy relationship between a colonial ruling class acting in 
collusion with "external capital". This ensured that New 
Zealand's development proceeded along lines which were 
advantageous to the purported needs of British capitalism. 
Armstrong states his case systematically: 
... the combination of British imperial dominance 
and a collaborative mercantile-financial-landed 
ruling group in New Zealand ... guaranteed the 
colony's full insertion into the world-system of 
the 19th and 20th centuries as a specialist staple 
producer and exporter, in return for the import of 
British capital, labour and manufactures. In such 
a scheme there was little place for an emergent 
industrial capitalism, nor for an autocentric 
pattern of development. Instead, the colony and 
later the nee-colony readily assumed its role in 
the international division of labour as an 
imperial farm. 22 
Few historians, Dennen among them, would disagree with 
the view that a "ruling group committed to the imperial link 
and to the production of export staples 1123 played a vital 
role in determining the pattern of economic development 
which emerged in New Zealand. However, I will show how the 
imperatives of imperialism coupled with the actions of the 
colonial ruling class is not an adequate explanation of the 
course and nature of New Zealand's economic development. 24 In 
a study of New Zealand's economic development, James Watson 
argues that changing technology associated with the second 
industrial revolution was fundamental to this shift towards 
22 'b. d l l ., p.301. 
23 D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of 
Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere, p.228. 
24 For a more complete discussion refer to section 4.3 
below. 
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a more specialized and dependent economy. 25 
On a more general level, Armstrong attempts to explain 
the apparent paradox which the combination of affluence and 
dependence presents to world-systems analysis by invoking a 
"dominion capitalist" pattern of development. By adopting 
the metaphors of world-systems analysis, the very nature of 
"dominion capitalism" is misconstrued and therefore makes 
several claims which I will show to be mistaken. Firstly, 
Armstrong claims that the characteristics which identify 
"dominion capitalist" nations make this "intermediate group" 
a "distinctive category within the world economy1126 • The 
following discussion27 will show that "dominion capitalist" 
states share more in common with other nations than they do 
with each other. As a result of its artificial nature, the 
"dominion capitalist" model of development cannot tell us 
anything useful about the development of nations like New 
Zealand. Secondly, Armstrong claims that the shift of the 
New Zealand economy from diversity to specialization was the 
result of the actions of a "comprador class 1128 acting to 
enforce New Zealand's role as an "imperial farm 1129 within the 
world economy. The final section of this discussion will 
25 J. Watson, 11 'Plus Ca Change ... ': Changing Technology 
and New Zealand's Dependence", Historical News, University 
of Canterbury, No.51., 1985. 
26 W. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: 
A First Statement", p.352. 
27 Refer to section 4. 2. 
28 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.300. 
29 ibid., p.301. 
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show that in trying to account for this 11 transition 1130 
Armstrong has misunderstood the significance of "dependent 
and lop-sided development". 31 It will become apparent that 
New Zealand's much vaunted dependence is little more than a 
symptom of declining self-sufficiency brought about by the 
shift in technology associated with the second industrial 
revolution. 
(4.2) The Validity of Dominion Capitalism. 
In this section, we will examine the characteristics of 
"dominion capitalism" in order to test Armstrong's claim 
that this group of nations forms a "distinctive category 
within the world economy. 1132 The purpose of this examination 
is twofold. Firstly, we will explore whether "dominion 
capitalist" countries have an exclusive monopoly on the set 
of characteristics which constitute ones membership of this 
"hybrid group". 33 It will become apparent that Armstrong's 
omission of Chile from this group is an oversight. More 
importantly, serious doubts regarding the inclusion of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand with these three Latin 
American states will become apparent. Finally, we will find 
30 'b' d 3 1 1 ., p. 00. 
31 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.299. 
32 W. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: 
A First Statement", p.352. 
33 w. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: The Origins 
of Dominion capitalism", p.28. 
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whether "dominion capitalism" functions as explanatory tool 
which enables social scientists to analyze the development 
of these states. 
Membership of the "dominion capitalist" group of states 
is based on a number of criteria of which the most salient 
are: 34 
1. Dominion capitalist states are temperate or semi-
temperate regions which received large numbers of European 
immigrants so that their current populations are largely of 
European descent. 
2. Dominion capitalist states share a demographic profile 
"comparable to those of modern western Europe". 35 We would 
therefore expect Uruguay, for instance, to have levels of 
urbanization, birth rates and life expectancy similar to 
those of Britain. 
3. Production is organized along capitalist lines and 
until relatively recently wage levels "approximated or 
exceeded those of Western Europe at least until World War 
II. 1136 In recognition of the comparative downward movements 
of wage levels in New Zealand37 Armstrong inserts the 
34 A list of nine features which constitute "dominion 
capitalism" is found in W. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, 
"Dominion Capitalism: A First Statement", p.352. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 In 1953, New Zealand's per-capita income placed her 
third behind the United States and Canada in the hierarchy 
of OECD members. During the last three decades this position 
has steadily declined from eighth in 1965 to 22nd in 1978. 
See: J.D. Gould, The Rake's Progress? The New Zealand 
Economy Since 1945, Hodder and Stoughton, 1982, p.22. 
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qualification that any parity with Western Europe is now 
only of historical significance. 
4. Exports consist mainly of primary products which are 
produced using levels of technology and ratios of capital to 
labour which are "typical of advanced industrial 
capitalism. 1138 
5. "The proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) generated 
by the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors also 
approximate those of modern Europe. 1139 
6. Dominion capitalist states are politically and 
economically dominated by the hegemonic imperialist power of 
the day. Trade and Investment are the tools of this 
domination. These instruments trade and investment, are now 
wielded by the U.S. rather than Britain but dominion 
capitalist states are still locked into dependency. 
It was not the arrival of white settlers themselves but 
what they brought with them, namely capitalism, that was to 
have such a profound impact on the development of countries 
like New Zealand. This is the main point lurking beneath 
Armstrong's rather generalized description of "dominion 
capitalism". Armstrong wishes to emphasize how the 
capitalism which was transplanted to the official British 
colonies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the 
"unofficial 1140 colonies of Argentina and Uruguay was not 
38 'b 'd l l • 
39 'b 'd l l • 
40 T. Brooking, "Why Did Farmer Protest Assume Such 
Different Forms in Late Nineteenth Century New Zealand and 
the U.S.A.", J. Phillips, New Worlds? The Comparative 
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identical to that operating in Britain. "Dominion 
capitalism", as it was to become, was a product of British 
imperialism with the development of those states proceeding 
along lines that were appropriate to the needs of the 
imperium. 
New Zealand's development as a specialist producer of 
agricultural commodities is an excellent example of how 
"dominion capitalism" neatly conformed to the colonial 
pattern of trade which saw Britain produce manufactured 
goods in exchange for agricultural products. It is the 
principal aim of this discussion to ascertain if these 
shared features of "dominion capitalist" states constitute 
an adequate explanation of their development. 
The first test of the validity of these criteria will 
examine the degree to which the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors of an economy contribute to the GDP of 
"dominion capitalist" states. Consequently, we would expect 
to find the contribution of the manufacturing sectors of 
this supposedly "distinctive category" fall within the range 
established by countries like Britain and France. With 
manufactu_ring expressed as a percentage of gross domestic 
product we would obtain the following-results: 41 
History of New Zealand and the United States, Stout Research 
Centre, 1989, p.126. 
41 UNCTD Handbook of International Trade and Development 
statistics, 1976, pp.360-63. 
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Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP. 
Canada 26% 
Australia 29% 
New Zealand 27% 
South Africa 24% 
Argentina 37% 
Chile 28% 
Uruguay 22% 
Despite the glaring exception of West Germany42 the 
manufacturing sectors of "dominion capitalist" countries 
produce similar proportions of GDP as modern European 
states. More importantly, these results show that Chile and 
South Africa should be included in Armstrong's "dominion 
capitalist" group of states. Indeed the only exceptional 
figure posted by this group was Argentina, a state which 
Armstrong includes. This surprising result would seem to 
indicate that Argentina's manufacturing sector is 
significantly more productive than Canada's. This 
questionable conclusion would require a closer ipspection of 
the validity of this basis of comparison. 
Argentina's exceptionally good showing may simply be 
the result of a particularly inefficient agricultural sector 
which endows the manufacturing sector ·with an inflated 
degree of prominence within the economy. Conversely, an 
unusually efficient agricultural sector may appear to 
diminish the importance of other sectors of the economy. An 
42 Manufacturing accounted for 43% of West Germany's 
GDP. UNCTD Handbook of International Trade and Development 
Statistics, 1976, pp.360-63. 
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examination of Argentinian agriculture reveals that 
inefficiency is indeed the source of this apparent anomaly. 
In 1970, an Argentinean agricultural worker only managed to 
produce 26% of the output generated by his New Zealand 
counterpart. 43 It would appear that the amount of GDP 
produced by certain sectors of the economy may be a slightly 
misleading measurement of the degree to which a country is 
utilizing modern productive facilities and methods. More 
importantly, Armstrong's use of this criteria as the basis 
of membership in the "dominion capitalist" group of states, 
begs the whole question of labour productivity which is the 
basis of the fourth criteria. The misleading results yielded 
by the ambiguities inherent in measurements of the 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP indicates the some 
modifications will have to be made to this fifth criteria 
which Armstrong uses to identify the member states of 
"dominion capitalism". 
A more accurate indication of manufacturing's 
contribution would examine the percentage of the total 
workforce engaged in manufacturing. 44 If we look at the 1970 
43 Argentina's per capita output was 51 wheat units 
compared with New Zealand's 198.2. See J.W. Kendrick and 
B.N. Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity Measurement 
and Analysis, p.530. 
44 "the most relevant single indicator of the degree to 
which a large or medium-sized economy is constructing modern 
productive forces is the proportion of the active population 
employed in modern manufacturing compared to that employed 
in backward agriculture." B. Warren, "Imperialism and 
Capitalist Industrialization", New Left Review, No.81., 
1973, p.10. 
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figures the following patterns emerge: 45 
Percentage of workforce engaged in manufacturing. 
Canada 22.9% 
Australia 26.9% 
New Zealand 26.6% 
South Africa 11. 3% 
Argentina 25.1% 
Chile 23.2% 
Uruguay 21. 0% 
On this basis alone we may well agree with Armstrong's 
exclusion of South Africa from his group of "dominion 
capitalist" states. His exclusion of Chile, however, would 
once again appear to be an oversight. 
With Armstrong's exclusion of South Africa vindicated 
we may now examine the affluence of "dominion capitalist" 
states in order to further test their eligibility for 
membership of this "distinctive category". If we compare the 
per capita income of "dominion capitalist" nations with 
developed capitalist nations the following figures emerge. 46 
45 ibid., pp.8-9. 
46 ibid. 
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settlers societies. Developed Capitalist. 
Canada $3260 u. s. $4664 
Australia $2660 Sweden $3490 
New Zealand $1918 Switzerland $2965 
South Africa $717 Belgium $2372 
Argentina $828 Netherlands $2196 
Chile $644 Britain $1976 
Uruguay $682 Italy $1548 
In terms of its affluence, Canada more correctly belongs to 
the group of the world's wealthiest countries such as the 
U.S., Sweden and Switzerland. Indeed there may even be a 
case for removing Australia and New Zealand from the group 
of "dominion capitalist" nations as their levels of 
affluence places them firmly alongside a group of countries 
such as Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands. 
It is also important to note that South Africa's 
comparatively modest wealth belies the fact that its 
minority white population enjoys a standard of living more 
in keeping with Australian and New Zealand levels on account 
of a more unequal distribution of South African wealth. 47 
Once again two important points emerge. Firstly, the group 
of nations which Armstrong claims form a "distinctive 
category" in fact have more in common with other nations 
than their fellow "dominion capitalist" compatriots. 
47 If we were to rank the world's nations according to 
the inequality of their income distribution then South 
Africa would occupy the 19th slot while New Zealand, Canada 
and Australia would occupy 57th, 58th and 60th respectively. 
C.L. Taylor, and D.A. Jadice, World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators, 3rd edition, vol.1., Yale University 
Press, 1983, pp.134-5. 
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Secondly and more importantly, the criteria which Armstrong 
chooses to define this allegedly "distinctive category" are 
ambiguous and misleading. 
The comparison of "dominion capitalism" with similar 
states has produced a conclusion which contains a number of 
interrelated points. Firstly, Armstrong has no valid basis 
for excluding Chile from "dominion capitalism" while 
including Argentina and Uruguay. Secondly, the disparity in 
the levels of affluence between the Latin American countries 
and the members of the old white commonwealth indicates that 
"dominion capitalist" nations do not constitute an 
"intermediate category" situated between the core and 
periphery of the world economy. It would appear that the 
conclusions of Shamir Amin, which Armstrong rejects, are 
borne out and that Canada, Australia and New Zealand are 
more correctly portrayed as "young central economies" . 48 
These two conclusions yield the third. Armstrong's concept 
of "dominion capitalism" is based on nothing more than a set 
of common but by no means exclusive characteristics. This 
shows that "dominion capitalist" nations do not form the 
kind of "distinctive category" which Armstrong maintains 
they do. 
Armstrong has found that a group of states with similar 
histories exhibit common characteristics which appear to 
warrant some kind of comparative analysis, the result of 
which could bring useful generalizations about their 
48 s. Amin, Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 
1976, Reproduced in W. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: 
The Origins of Dominion Capitalism'', pp. 30-31. 
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development. The error apparent in this kind of comparative 
analysis arises from the argument that affluence and 
dependence combined, constitutes "dominion capitalism" only 
when found in those countries. Whatever the basis of 
membership, it is now clear that "dominion capitalist" 
states form little more than an artificial category which 
cannot provide the historian with any useful insights into 
the development of those countries. 
Armstrong concludes in later articles that in the 
contemporary era, there is no such thing as a "dominion 
capitalist" group of states: 
... in the post WW.II. decades ... it was no longer 
possible to speak of them as dominion capitalist 
societies. Both the internal and external 
historical conditions had by then changed so that 
the differences outweighed the similarities. The 
dominion capitalist societies were the product of 
a specific era in the history of capitalism. 49 
While Armstrong is correct to emphasize the "differences" 
rather than the "similarities" of "dominion capitalist" 
states, his conclusion has shied away from the main point. 
"Dominion capitalism" never had any causal validity, 
"historical" or otherwise. The divergent paths of 
development followed by this group of states underlies the 
point that a concept of "dominion capitalism" is entirely 
superficial and cannot by itself explain the development of 
these states. In order to emphasize this point we will test 
the explanatory validity of the concept of "dominion 
capitalism". This will be done by examining whether 
49 W. Armstrong and J. Bradbury, "Industrialization and 
Class Structure in Australia, Canada and Argentina: 1870 to 
1980 11 , p.52. 
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"dependence on imperial centres" has "conditioned the scope, 
rate and pattern of New Zealand's development". 50 
In his discussion of the impact of imperialism on New 
Zealand, Armstrong reiterates the now familiar argument of 
those nee-Marxists influenced by Wallerstein. Consequently, 
Armstrong claims that the annexation and colonization of New 
Zealand was partly caused by the imperatives of British 
imperialism. This familiar catechism equates these 
imperatives with Britain's alleged need for new markets, new 
sources of raw materials, new investment opportunities and 
an outlet for her surplus population. 51 
Although Armstrong makes little attempt to justify this 
claim he does acknowledge its weaknesses. In a tacit 
rejection of Bedggood's simplistic explanation, Armstrong 
notes that had New Zealand been annexed as a source of raw 
materials "the lack·of immediately observable resources in 
the new colony" would have made it a "dubious acquisition 
for Britain11 • 52 It was only with the advent of refrigeration, 
three decades after annexation, that New Zealand was able to 
function as an imperial larder. Armstrong correctly argues 
that because Colonial Office officials could not know that 
gold or refrigeration would transform New Zealand's economy, 
the need for "cheap raw materials" could not have been one 
50 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.297. 
51 W. Armstrong, "Industrialization and Class Structure 
in Australia, Canada and Argentina", p.49. 
52 W. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: the Origins 
of Dominion Capitalism", p.38. 
of the factors which convinced them to proceed with 
annexation. 
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Having avoided the pitfalls of Bedggood's rigidly 
functionalist explanation, Armstrong falls into the same 
trap as Steven by assuming that the systematic colonization 
theories of Wakefield eventually persuaded the colonial 
office to annex New Zealand in 1840: 
The colonial reformers - whose interests also 
spilled over from settlement into land speculation 
- were able to persuade the imperial government 
that annexation would help provide an answer to 
the social problem at home without severely 
reducing the reserve army of labour in Britain. n 53 
Thus persuaded, the "imperial government" annexed New 
Zealand in order to provide Britain with an outlet for her 
surplus population. The only defense Armstrong offers in 
support of his explanation of annexation is that it "suited 
the imperial interests of Britain looking ... for open 
frontiers in which to invest surplus capital and labour. u54 
The co-incidence between Britain's need to rid herself of 
surplus population and New Zealand's potential to absorb it 
does not prove that New Zealand was annexed in order to 
fulfil that role. As a general rule, correlations do not 
constitute causes. 
This confusion of correlations with causes stands at 
the heart of Armstrong's error in his account of the 
development of "dominion capitalist" states. "Dominion 
capitalism" is defined by the correlations which exist 
53 ibid., p. 38 • 
54 ibid., p.40. 
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between the countries which constitute this "hybrid group". 
Any attempt to account for the causes of New Zealand's 
development by employing to these correlations is, 
therefore, based on a faulty notion of those factors which 
constitute a cause. Even if my criticism were misplaced, 
Armstrong would still have to show why the role played by 
all "dominion capitalist" nations as an imperial larder 
resulted in such divergent patterns of development. Despite 
the common characteristics shared by all "dominion 
capitalist" nations, some 'independent variable' must 
explain why Canada differs in so many respects from 
Argentina. For Armstrong, this independent variable is the 
role played by domestic ruling groups within the context of 
imperialism. New Zealand's shift towards the specialist 
production of foodstuffs for the British market is, 
therefore, explained by referring to the policies enforced 
by the ruling class acting in collusion with the wishes of 
external capital. The nexus formed by the needs of British 
capitalism and a comprador ruling class, therefore, 
determines the way (albeit varied) in which dominion 
capitalist countries develop. 
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(4.3) The Britain of the South Pacific? 
Throughout his political career, Julius Vogel advocated 
the creation of a united Pacific empire with New Zealand as 
its central governing authority: 
The ultimate object which I have in view ••• is the 
establishment of the Polynesian Islands as one 
Dominion, with New Zealand the centre of 
government: the Dominion, like Canada, to be a 
British dependency. 55 
Although his imperialistic aims were never realized, Vogel's 
ambitious plans for New Zealand's economic development were 
enthusiastically adopted during his tenure as Colonial 
Treasurer and later as Premier. As the architect of deficit 
funded development, Vogel embarked on a public works 
programme to provide New Zealand with a transport 
infrastructure. This network was intended to propel New 
Zealand along the road to full economic development. The 
irony of this kind of colonial "think big" is not lost on 
Armstrong who notes how New Zealand never became, 
as colonial premier Julius Vogel had envisaged, a 
'Britain of the South Pacific', a full fledged 
industrial capitalist economy. 1156 . 
Vogel's attempts to construct "industrial capitalism" in New 
Zealand were ultimately abortive, and the colony's 
prosperity became increasingly dependent upon the production 
of a narrow range of agricultural commodities. By the early 
twentieth century, the overwhelming dominance of 
55 A. Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in 
the Nineteenth Century, Clarendon Press, 1964, p.117. 
56 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.299. 
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agricultural production had become the central feature of 
the New Zealand economy. 
Armstrong claims that this shift towards an increasing 
dependence on agriculture was brought about at the behest of 
a ruling elite whose interests were clearly aligned to the 
agricultural sector. This emphasis on agricultural 
production saw the implementation of policies which resulted 
in the decimation of New Zealand's manufacturing sector: 
•.• this cluster of interests organized around 
staples exports enforced policies at the end of 
the nineteenth century which effectively 
dismantled the local, diversified manufacturing 
sector which had arisen between the 1860 1 s and 
1880 1 s. 1157 
The "cluster" which led New Zealand down the path towards 
"dependent" and "lop-sided development 1158 comprised the 
"economic leaders and political directors of colonial 
society". 59 In one of his more polemical statements Armstrong 
claims that by acting to satiate the needs of British 
. 
capitalism, New Zealand's ruling class ensured that all 
subsequent development became dependant upon the production 
of a narrow range of agricultural commodities: 
New Zealand has not been able to throw off the 
legacy of dependence inherited from a structure 
where a comprador bourgeoisie, and landed class, 
and a subaltern state have collaborated in 
colonial and neo-colonial settings. 60 
57 w. Armstrong and P. Ehrensaft, "Dominion Capitalism: 
A First Statement", p.360. 
58 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.299. 
59 'b, d l l ., p.297. 
60 w. Armstrong, "Land, Class, Colonialism: The Origins 
of Dominion Capitalism", p.40. 
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For Armstrong then, the essential nature of New Zealand's 
economic development is encapsulated in this shift away from 
a relatively diversified economy to one increasingly 
orientated to the specialist production of agricultural 
commodities. Although Armstrong claims that New Zealand was 
a "society containing the germs of an independent, 
autocentric industrial capitalist development", 61 he offers 
little empirical evidence in support of the counterfactual 
assertion that New Zealand was on the road to 
industrialization. 
In order to test Armstrong's explanation of the nature 
and causes of New Zealand's economic development it wiil, 
therefore be necessary to examine in greater detail than 
that provided by Armstrong, the "crucial transition 1162 where 
the New Zealand economy apparently eschewed diversity in 
favour of specialization. 
In its simplest sense, the extent to which an economy 
is diversified is determined by the variety of productive 
activities engaged within it. In a largely agricultural 
economy like New Zealand's any evidence of diversity would 
be found in the presence of vibrant industrial and 
manufacturing sectors. In short, production which was not 
agricultural. If we were to describe the New Zealand economy 
in terms of a movement towards specialization, on the other 
hand, we would expect to find a lack of diversity. Here 
61 W. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p.300. 
62 'b 'd l l • 
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Armstrong would point to the increasing importance of 
agriculture and the subordination of industry to the 
processing of agricultural commodities. As the following 
discussion will show, there is considerable evidence to 
support Armstrong's characterization of New Zealand's 
economic development as a shift away from diversity to 
specialization. 
Prior to this "transition", Armstrong argues that the 
New Zealand economy was relatively diversified. Perhaps the 
best evidence for this claim is found in the expansion of 
the non-agricultural workforce. Between 1871 and 1881, the 
industrial labour force grew from 10,000 to 15,500, an 
increase of 64% in a decade.~ The rapid construction of New 
Zealand's railway network is a tangible example of the 
presence of a vibrant industrial sector. Once again, the 
decade of the 1870 1 s showed the greatest achievements in 
this area with the bulk of the national railway network 
being laid between 1873 and 1880. 64 Moreover, railway 
workshops became New Zealand's largest industrial 
enterprises with the first locally built locomotive being 
completed in 1877. 65 This heady decade also witnessed the 
development of a vibr~nt manufacturing sector which was 
beginning to show signs of maturity by the 1880 1 s. New 
63 W.J. Gardner, "A Colonial Economy", p.73. 
64 During this period 1,143 of the 1,288 miles of open 
track had been laid. See W.J. Gardner, "A Colonial Economy", 
p.72. 
65 W.B. Sutch, Poverty and Progress in New Zealand: A 
Re-Assessment, A.H. And A.W. Reed, 1969, pp.88-89. 
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Zealand manufacturing had become sufficiently advanced that 
its products were able to compete successfully on the 
international market. Farm machinery such as disk harrows 
and ploughs.were being exported to South Africa while gold 
dredges were sent to markets as diverse as Australia, Brazil 
and China. New Zealand manufacturers were also successful in 
the highly competitive textile market with woollen cloth 
being exported to Australia and India, as well as the 
heartlands of textile manufacturing in England and 
Scotland.~ 
Despite the impressive achievements of the late 
nineteenth century, New Zealand's economic development 
became increasingly dependent on the agricultural sector. 
The following table shows how this tendency gathered 
momentum into the twentieth century with wool, meat, diary 
and grain comprising 68% of the value of exports in 1890 and 
a staggering 95% by 1925. 67 
~ 'b'd l l ., pp.99-100. 
67 M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, Collins, 1970, pp.291 and 409. 
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Agricultural commodities expressed as a percentage 
of the total value of New Zealand's exports. 
1880 67% 
1885 64% 
1890 68% 
1895 66% 
1900 72% 
1905 63% 
1910 67% 
1915 85% 
1920 93% 
1925 95% 
From the late nineteenth century onwards, manufacturing not 
associated with agriculture tended to stagnate. If we were 
to rank manufacturing industries in terms of their ability 
to generate revenue then the four largest in 1911 were those 
involved in the processing of agricultural commodities. 68 
Value of production by industry. 
Meat preserving and freezing 
Butter and cheese 
Saw mills 
Tanning and fellmongering 
Tailoring and dressmaking 
£7.3 
£3.9 
£2.7 
£2.0 
£1.5 
Although clothing manufacturers employed the largest 
national workforce, 8353 in all, their annual revenue of 
£1.5 were dwarfed by the £7.3 generated by the meat 
processing industries.~ 
68 M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, p.413. 
69 'b'd 1 1 • 
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New Zealand trade has always depended on a narrow range 
of export markets. Between 1880 and 1925, Britain, Australia 
and the United States accounted for 95% to 98% of New 
Zealand's export markets. The following table shows how New 
Zealand was heavily dependent on a narrow range of import 
and export markets.ro 
New Zealand's trade profile. 
1) Destination of exports. 
Britain Australia U.S.A Total 
1880 75% 21% 2% 97% 
1885 72% 20% 6% 98% 
1890 75% 15% 6% 96% 
1895 83% 12% 2% 97% 
1900 77% 14% 40 ~ 95% 
1905 77% 15% 5% 97% 
1910 84% 9% 3% 96% 
1915 74% 5% 16% 95% 
1920 80% 5% 9% 94% 
2) Source of imports. 
Britain Australia U.S.A. Total 
1880 56% 31% 4% 91% 
1885 70% 18% 5% 93% 
1890 67% 17% 5% 89% 
1895 63% 20% 6% 89% 
1900 61% 17% 10% 88% 
1905 61% 14% 11% 86% 
1910 62% 14% 8% 84% 
Within the context of this dependence, however, New Zealand 
70 M.F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, pp.172, 209, 297. 
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became even more dependent. While Australia had dominated 
New Zealand trade (both import and export) in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Britain loomed even larger by the 
early twentieth century. In 1857, Australia was the source 
of 52% of New Zealand's imports and the outlet for 62% of 
New Zealand's exports. 71 By 1910 these figures had dropped to 
14% and 9% respectively. The importance of the Australian 
connection had been replaced and eclipsed by Britain which 
provided New Zealand with 62% of its imports while taking a 
massive 84% of its exports.n 
In accounting for the cause of New Zealand's shift away 
from diversity towards specialization, Armstrong stresses 
the role of imperialism and the alignment of political and 
economic power in the colony itself. Given the possibilities 
opened up by refrigeration, the colonial ruling class found 
it profitable to ensure that economic development proceeded 
along lines which would enable New Zealand to function as an 
"imperial farm 11 • 73 
Armstrong's explanation for New Zealand's economic 
development is curiously incomplete. While Armstrong 
concentrates on some aspects concerning the context of 
production, he completely ignores others which I will show 
were crucial. Although he stresses the way in which the 
71 C.G.F. Simkin, The Instability of a Dependent 
Economy: Economic Fluctuations in New Zealand 1840-1914, 
Oxford University Press, 1951, p.194. 
72 M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, p.209. 
73 w. Armstrong, "New Zealand: Imperialism, Class and 
Uneven Development", p. 301. 
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"needs of the British economy going through the second 
industrial revolution1174 were mediated through New Zealand's 
compliant ruling class, he fails to take full account of the 
effects of the second industrial revolution. 
It will be my argument that changing requirements of 
production associated with the second industrial revolution 
form an indispensable part of an explanation of the changing 
patterns of economic development in New Zealand. His rather 
incomplete account of the context of production has caused 
Armstrong to largely ignore the requirements of production 
in New Zealand during the first and second industrial 
revolution. Armstrong's explanation takes no account, 
therefore, of the profound impact on production in New 
Zealand associated with the shift from coal and oats to oil 
and electricity. If we construct an explanation based on the 
requirements rather than the context of production, we will 
attain a very different account of the nature and causes of 
New Zealand's economic development. 
In the process of describing the apparent diversity of 
the New Zealand economy, James Watson shows that production 
carried out in the colony itself supplied New Zealand with 
most of its needs. In an important distinction regarding the 
nature of New Zealand's economic diversification he 
concludes: 
Certainly the country was solidly linked into the 
international economy via its need to market its 
primary produce, but that production was not 
74 'b 'd l l ., p.300. 
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itself heavily dependent on imports. 75 
New Zealand's remarkable degree of self-sufficiency 
fulfilled its consumptive and productive requirements. 
Needless to say, New Zealand produced most of its own food. 
The most significant imported food item was sugar which 
constituted anything from 4% to 9% of the colony's total 
import bill between 1882 and 1895 .,76 An examination of New 
Zealand's major imports in 1870 shows that in terms of 
value, sugar was seconq only to drapery! 77 With the 
importation of sugar cane imported from Fiji, however, 
significant quantities of the refined product were being 
exported by New Zealand by 1900. 78 Despite its importation of 
cotton, New Zealand produced most of its own clothing. The 
I 
construction of woollen mills, of which there were nine by 
1896, 79 ensured that the value of domestic production 
exceeded that of imported woollen goods by the turn of the 
century.M 
75 J. Watson, 11 'Plus Ca Change ... ' Changing Technology 
and New Zealand's Dependence", Historical News, No.51., 
University of Canterbury, 1985, p.4. 
76 M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, p.411. 
77 While imported drapery cost £6-36,936 sugar was the 
second most valuable import at a cost of £259,262. 
Agricultural implements and machinery combined only cost the 
colony £63,959. See M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History 
of New Zealand, p.115. 
78 J. Watson, 11 'Plus Ca Change ... ' Changing Technology 
and New Zealand's Dependence", p.2. 
79 W.B. Sutch, Poverty and Progress in New Zealand: A 
Re-Assessment, p.99. 
80 J. Watson, "'Plus Ca Change ... ' Changing Technology 
and New Zealand's Dependence", p.2. 
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The degree of self-sufficiency found in the consumer 
goods sector was also characteristic of other areas of 
production with a large proportion of the inputs being 
produced in New Zealand. The overwhelming majority of 
building materials used by the building industry were 
produced in New Zealand. Timber, the most commonly used 
building material, was all locally milled. The manufacture 
of cement began during the l880 1 s 81 while New Zealand 
brickworks produced a record 73 million bricks in 1925. 82 
Agricultural production became increasingly reliant on 
agricultural implements, the majority of which were 
manufactured in New Zealand. Local production outstripped 
the imBortation of farm equipment in the late nineteenth 
century with New Zealand made ploughs, disk harrows and 
chaff cutters being exported. 83 New Zealand was able to 
participate in the heavy industry of the first industrial 
revolution with the colony manufacturing all its steam 
locomotives by the end of the nineteenth century. 84 
Boilermaking was not confined to railway workshops 
however. The freezing works and diary factories which sprung 
up after the introduction of refrigerated shipping all 
installed locally manufactured boilers .. Furthermore, the 
coal used to fuel these factories and locomotives was 
81 M.F. Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New 
Zealand to 1939, p.149. 
82 'b 'd l l ., p.332. 
83 W.B. Sutch, Poverty and Progress in New Zealand: A 
Re-Assessment, pp.99-100. 
84 ibid., p.100. 
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locally mined while the motive power which drove agriculture 
was provided by locally bred horses consuming locally grown 
fuel, in the form of oats and barley. 
The main point here is that the requirements of 
production associated with technology based on coal and. oats 
allowed New Zealand to be largely self-sufficient. The most 
important feature of the economy's diversity, therefore, was 
not diversity itself but that production was based on inputs 
which were locally produced. Any diversity which the New 
Zealand economy displayed was simply a reflection of that 
self-sufficiency. Once production became more reliant on 
imported inputs, as it did with the onset of the second 
industrial revolution, the New Zealand economy would become 
more specialized. 
Agricultural production was transformed by the 
introduction of tractors and lorries. Unlike the traction 
engine and the draught horse team they replaced, these farm 
implements were not manufactured locally and the petrol they 
consumed had to be imported. New Zealand's declining self-
sufficiency was further exacerbated with coal fired boilers 
being replaced with electricity in much of New Zealand's 
manufacturing sector. Although hydro~electric power stations 
did not run on imported fuels, the turbine generators they 
required were not produced by the local engineering industry 
and had to be imported. With domestic production declining 
in self-sufficiency, the New Zealand economy became less 
diversified as more and more of the inputs required by 
agriculture and industry were produced overseas. The 
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enormous increases in productivity which the second 
industrial revolution brought about, per capita production 
in New Zealand rose from £41.77 to £49.3 between 1901 and 
1906,M were bought at the "expense of decreased national 
self-sufficiency."M 
Once again, the importance of this move towards 
increased specialization was not specialization itself, but 
the way in which New Zealand's economic development became 
more dependant on trade. With production becoming more 
dependent on imports, continued economic development 
required a similar increase in exports. Had New Zealand been 
a big country with a large domestic market, the changes in 
production wrought by the use of oil and electricity would 
not have resulted in an increasing dependence on trade. As 
it was, New Zealand exported over 30% of its gross domestic 
product in 1950 while exports only amounted to 8% of the GDP 
of the United States. 87 This reliance and comparative non-
reliance on trade is an indication of the degree of self-
sufficiency of the two economies. 
While the large domestic market of the United States 
provided an ideal environment for the mass production 
techniques of Henry Ford, New Zealand's size conspired 
85 C.G.F. Simkin, The Instability of a Dependent 
Economy: Economic Fluctuation in New Zealand 1840-1914, 
p.188. 
M J. Watson, '''Plus Ca Change ... ' Changing Technology 
and New Zealand's Dependence", p.4. 
ITT s. Chatterjee, ''International Trade: Structure and 
Policy", S. Birks and s. Chatterjee, The New Zealand 
Economy: Issues and Policies, Dunmore Press, 1988, p.191. 
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against the development of a similar automobile industry. 
New Zealand was well placed to meet the requirements of the 
first industrial revolution but not the second. The 
requirements of production based on oil and electricity 
forced New Zealand to become dependent on trade in a way 
that the United States did not. In the words of a leading 
economist: 
•.. small countries like New Zealand cannot afford 
to be self-sufficient if they wish to achieve and 
maintain a high standard of living. 88 
Contrary to Armstrong's claim, the patterns of New Zealand's 
economic development were not determined by the needs of 
British capitalism, mediated through the policies enforced 
by a compliant ruling class. New Zealand's shift towards 
specialization was the result of declining self-sufficiency 
brought about by the changing requirements of production 
based on oil and electricity. 
88 'b 'd l l ., p.190. 
conclusion. 
IS" 2... }4'b 
This survey of nee-Marxist interpretations of New 
Zealand history was undertaken as part of a wider interest 
in the interplay between theory and history. I have argued 
that these approaches are theoretically and empirically 
deficient and do not allow us to make sense of New Zealand 
history. Quite simply, the theories have gaps and 
contradictions and do not fit the facts. 
The nee-Marxist approaches we have examined are 
modifications of Wallerstein's world-systems theory. All 
accept that New Zealand's development was determined by its 
role within the world economy. Furthermore, all allot New 
Zealand a role somewhere between the industrialized 
countries and the third world. Wallerstein's "semi-
periphery" is Bedggood's "semi-colony" and this is in turn 
related to Steven's "settler capitalism" and Armstrong's 
"dominion capitalism". All struggle to explain New Zealand's 
prosperity as an agricultural producer in a world system 
which they claim is dominated by the industrialized 
countries. The following discussion will show how serious 
deficiencies arise from interpretations of New Zealand 
history which are based on arguments derived from these neo-
Marxist perspectives. 
Bedggood, Steven and Armstrong agree that New Zealand 
was annexed in order to provide Britain with an outlet for 
surplus population. We have seen that this argument has two 
serious deficiencies. First, Britain did not need to annex 
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countries in order to rid herself of surplus population. The 
most numerically significant destination for British 
immigrants was the United States, a country which was no 
longer a British colony. Annexation, therefore, was not 
necessary as an encouragement for immigration. The second 
point is that there is no evidence that the Colonial Office 
annexed New Zealand with a desire to ease population 
pressure. This lack of evidence forces neo-Marxists to claim 
that this motive was covered up. Such a reply fails because 
a justification for annexation on the grounds that it would 
secure an outlet for surplus population would have been 
popular. Wakefield's theories of systematic colonization 
enjoyed widespread approval and government policies 
motivated by a Wakefieldian desire to send Britons to new 
lands would not have required a disguise. 
Bedggood and Steven argue that New Zealand's prosperity 
was explained by her exploitative role within an 
international system of unequal exchange. They claim that 
international trade was characterized by unequal exchange 
which allowed New Zealand to transfer to itself surplus 
generated in Britain. This exploitation is said to be the 
consequence of the way prices diverged-from values, a 
phenomenon which allowed commodities of different values to 
exchange at the same price. Such a theory of unequal 
exchange is predicated on the contradictory assumptions 
surrounding Marx's labour theory of value. Contrary to the 
neo-Marxist claim, that theory, cannot support the claim 
that commodity exchange results in the exploitation of one 
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trading partner by another. Bedggood and Steven, therefore, 
fail to show that New Zealand exploited Britain by receiving 
more value in exchange for less. 
When confronted with specific objections to their 
notion of unequal exchange Bedggood and Steven respond by 
advancing an equally fallacious notion of monopoly. They 
conclude that the monopoly of agricultural producers over a 
limited resource -the land- enabled New Zealand to protect 
the cost advantages of its agricultural production. I have 
shown, however, that their claims of monopoly are ill-
founded. Existing agricultural producers were not able to 
eliminate competition from newcomers by denying them land, 
for new land was continually being opened up, especially in 
the "white settler colonies". Furthermore, the technological 
improvements applied to agricultural production, which 
allowed for greater production from the same area of land, 
offset any monopolistic tendencies by boosting production 
and forcing down prices. 
The argument that New Zealand's development as a 
specialist producer of agricultural commodities was caused 
by the colony's role within the international division of 
labour is also subject to several objections. Armstrong 
claims that New Zealand's function as an "imperial farm" was 
bought about by a colonial ruling class whose 
representatives perused policies which provided British 
capitalism with cheap foodstuffs. Bedggood and Steven simply 
explain New Zealand's role as a "highly efficient 
agricultural producer" by referring to the superior 
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fertility of colonial land. Although profoundly different in 
their emphasis, these nee-Marxist explanations misunderstand 
the nature of agricultural production in New Zealand. 
While New Zealand agriculture is highly efficient, this 
has not been due to exceptional fertility. Such efficiency 
was largely the result of a vastly more favourable ratio of 
land to labour. Lack of population pressure also forms the 
basis of efficient agricultural production in other 'regions 
of recent settlement' such as Australia and Argentina. 
More important, New Zealand's increasing dependence on 
a narrow range of export staples was the result of 
technology associated with production based on oil and 
electricity. This dependence was little more than a symptom 
of production in New Zealand becoming increasingly reliant 
on imported inputs. The neo-Marxist perspective adopted by 
Armstrong has resulted in his misunderstanding the nature 
and significance of New Zealand's dependence. Overall, New 
Zealand's economic development was not the result of a 
conspiracy between the local ruling class and the forces of 
international capitalism. 
The inability of the neo-Marxist accounts of Bedggood, 
Steven and Armstrong to account for the development of New 
Zealand points to difficulties inherent in Wallerstein's 
explanation of the development of the semi-periphery within 
the capitalist world economy. The development of members of 
the "old white commonwealth" is an aspect of Wallerstein's 
analysis which exposes most vividly the problematic nature 
of the world-systems approach. 
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